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AND RELATED DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
BORIS KOZOLCHYK*
INTRODUCTION
Computers, telephones, and artificial satellites have made the 24-hour
global financial marketplace a reality. At any hour of the day, a trader of
goods, services, or financial undertakings can, by using computers linked with
telephone lines, microwave dishes, or artificial satellites, engage in
transactions to sell, buy, lease, assign, or borrow instantaneously with another
trader, no matter how distant. Bank letters of credit and guarantees occupy
an important corner of this global marketplace. And while most letter-of-
credit communications between banks and beneficiaries are still paper-based,
communications among banks themselves are in very large measure
paperless. According to reliable estimates, seventy-five percent of banks'
requests for other banks' issuance, advice, confirmation, or negotiation of
credits are sent electronically; the remainder are sent by letter.'
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Similarly, the number of applicants who are linked to computer systems
that enable them to tailor the terms and conditions of their credits and
telecommunicate them to the issuing banks has also increased sharply. At one
large regional bank, the increase over the last five years has been
approximately 500 percent.2 Finally, an increasing number of letters of credit
issued by both banks and nonbanks are being communicated directly by
issuers to the beneficiaries' computers,3 and other letters of credit (still a
small number) are communicated to beneficiaries through nonbanking "value
added networks" or via bank proprietary systems.
Despite the large volume and worldwide scope of these paperless
transactions, their "rules of traffic" and formal requirements have yet to be
validated legislatively, administratively, or judicially. Thus no positive law
exists, for example, on the time when an issuing bank's promise of payment or
of reimbursement becomes irrevocably binding on an issuer, or on the
formalities of the "operative credit instrument" (including the need for a
writing and signature), or on interbank liability for negligent, delayed, or
fraudulent transmissions. Rules do exist, however, for the operation of the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications ("SWIFT"),4
a banking telecommunications network whose letter-of-credit transactions will
be described in this article. Moreover, the same banks that now send
paperless messages to one another adhere universally to the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits ("UCP").5 But the interaction
between the UCP and SWIFT rules is not entirely harmonious, and conflicts
are similarly apparent between the recently enacted article 4A of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") and the practices of banks engaged in prepaying,
paying, or reimbursing letters of credit.
In short, the time is now ripe for a normative analysis of paperless letters
of credit that will categorize the various transactions and delineate the
boundaries and relative standing of the competing sets of rules. This analysis
should also suggest when an official legal rule is needed and what its thrust
should be.
usually communicated directly by the issuing bank to the beneficiary. Yet, while this is true for
national standbys, international standbys are often telecommunicated.
2. Telephone interview with Maryann Pizzulo, of NCNB Bank (May 1, 1991).
3. Id.
4. See SWIFT User Handbook version 1.0, 89/4. Throughout the remainder of this article,
"SWIFT User Handbook" and "SWIFT rules" will be used interchangeably. Unless otherwise
specified, the version of the Handbook cited here will be used throughout this article. Occasionally,
where SWIFT merely comments on a procedure without setting forth a rule, the reference will be to
the Handbook chapter and page.
5. The UCP are the most widely observed customary banking rules in the world. They are
promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce, headquartered in Paris, France and are
revised from time to time to keep up with technological, business, and legal developments. The
present revision is from 1983 and is found in Publication Number 400 of the International Chamber
of Commerce. References to the UCP throughout this article will be to this publication. Publication
Number 500 is now almost complete and will probably come into effect at the end of 1992. For a
discussion of the normative value of the UCP as a source of letter-of-credit law, see Boris Kozolchyk,
Letters of Credit, 9 Intl Encyclopedia Comparative L 5-15 through 5-36 U3. C. B. Mohr, 1979).
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This article will undertake such an analysis together with a detailed
description of customary practices in the United States and, where
appropriate, elsewhere as well. Furthermore, since the time is nearing when
paperless documents will be presented to banks in purported compliance with
paperless credits, this article will explore-albeit in lesser detail-the
"presentation" of paperless bills of lading in fulfillment of a condition of
payment.
I
PAPERLESS CREDIT PROMISES
A. The SWIFT Letter of Credit
1. EDI as the Technological Basis of SWIFT. In 1974, most letters of credit
were communicated by mail, cable, or telex. Article 4 of the 1974 revision of
the UCP reflected this practice by listing "cable, telegram or telex" as the
means with which to "instruct" letters of credit.6 The 1983 UCP, however,
replaced the reference to "cable, telegram or telex" with "teletransmission,"
thereby acknowledging a remarkable shift in banking practice. In less than a
decade, the bulk of interbank letter-of-credit messages switched from paper
communications to teletransmissions. 7 A closer look at the evolution of the
format of letters of credit reveals that the shift to an electronic format started
many years earlier with the introduction of cabled and telexed letters of
credit. A "tested" telex contained many of the same elements-although not
the same technology-as the current electronic letter of credit. Its
"authenticator" key acted as the means to verify the authenticity and integrity
of the message, much as SWIFT's algorithm does today.
6. Article 4 of the 1974 UCP states: "When an issuing bank instructs a bank by cable, telegram
or telex to advise a credit, and intends the mail confirmation to be the operative credit instrument,
the cable, telegram or telex must state that the credit will only be effective on receipt of such mail
confirmation."
7. Article 12 of the 1983 UCP reads as follows:
(a) When an issuing bank instructs a bank (advising bank) by any teletransmission to
advise a credit or an amendment to a credit, and intends the mail confirmation to be the
operative credit instrument, or the operative amendment, the teletransmission must state
"full details to follow" (or words of similar effect), or that the mail confirmation will be the
operative credit instrument or the operative amendment. The issuing bank must forward
the operative credit instrument or the operative amendment to such advising bank without
delay.
(b) The teletransmission will be deemed to be the operative credit instrument or the
operative amendment, and no mail confirmation should be sent, unless the teletransmission
states "full details to follow" (or words of similar effect) or states that the mail confirmation
is to be the operative credit instrument or the operative amendment.
When consulted by the Austrian National Committee on the precise meaning of
"teletransmission," the Commission on Banking Technique and Practice of the ICC ("Banking
Commission") replied that "teletransmission" did not include phone communications but did
include instructions received by telefax. Meeting of April 23, 1985, ICC Doc 470/444, 470/452
(1985). As a consequence, a letter of credit transmitted by telefax bearing the correct test key
constituted an operative credit instrument for purposes of article 12b. See Opinion R99, ICC Doc
434 (1984-1986).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
SWIFT was created in 1973 as a bank-owned, Belgian, not-for-profit
cooperative organization. Its purpose was to facilitate the transmission of
bank-to-bank financial transaction messages.8 An experienced American
banker estimated the cost of sending a letter of credit by telex in the early
1980s to be between ten and twenty-five dollars as compared to 17.5 Belgian
francs or approximately fifty cents had the same message been sent by
SWIFT.9 This saving was made possible by the adoption of a method of
electronic communication known as Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI").
EDI's application to financial, bank-to-bank messages has lowered costs by
requiring that the messages be structured in uniform fashion, including
standardized elements for the allocation of message space and for the text of
the message itself. This emphasis on uniformity and standardization has
made it possible for the computers communicating through EDI to exchange
and process data without rekeying the data. l0
EDI borrowed from the printed "boilerplate" paper forms the notion that
the location of the data conveys a specific meaning and is, therefore, an
integral part of the message. For example, a number placed in the quantity
column of an invoice conveys a meaning quite different from the meaning
conveyed by the same number placed in the price column. A reader familiar
with such a paper format will thus automatically look to the quantity column
for information on the size of the shipment and to the price column for
information on its cost. In EDI jargon, then, a "transaction set" contains the
electronic directions or location "lines" that designate the proper place in
which data must appear." These lines reflect the practices of parties dealing
with specific EDI messages, and once the practice (or agreement on what the
practice should be) is sufficiently widespread, an EDI standards committee
8. For excerpts from SWIFT's "General Terms and Conditions" as well as "Articles of
Association," see Herbert F. Lingl, Risk Allocation in International Electronic Fund Transfers: Chips and
Swift, 22 Harv Intl LJ 621, 622-23 nn4 & 7 (1981). Robert Winder attributes SWIFT's uniqueness to
the fact that it was a joint-owned cooperative at a time when "the ambitious banks were already
spraying computing power across the world in an attempt to establish a market advantage." Robert
Winder, Too SWIFTfor Comfort, Euromoney 55 (Jan 1985). On Swift's growing role, see Ezra U. Byler
& James C. Baker, SWIFT A Fast Method to Facilitate International Financial Transaction, 17 J World
Trade L 458, 461 (1983). See also Note, The Courts and CHIPS SWIFT & FEDWIRE: A Proposal for
Filling the Regulatory Gap, 2 Intl Prop Inv J 271 (1984) (authored by Lawrence S. Drexler).
9. Dan Taylor stated that one major bank calculated the cost per message to be at least one-
fifth the cost of sending a message without SWIFT. Interview with Dan Taylor, Executive Director of
USCIB (Jan 10, 1990). USCIB is an umbrella organization, headquartered in New York City at the
World Trade Center, that represents the interests of approximately 400 banks involved in
international banking transactions.
10. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Electronic Data Interchange,
Preliminary Study of Legal Issues Related to The Formation of Contracts for Electronic Means 5
(May 18, 1990) (report of Sectretary General) (A/CN.9/333) ("UNCITRAL 1990"). See also
American Bar Association, Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic
Data Interchange-A Report, 45 Bus L 1647, 1650 (1990) ("ABA Report"). More generally, see
Benjamin Wright, EDI and American La--A Practical Guide (Electronic Data Interchange Assn, 1989).
11. For the remainder of this section, I will borrow from the description of the EDI formulation
of message process in a student paper by Douglas Morrison, The Statute of Frauds Online: Can a
Computer Sign a Contract for the Sale of Goods?, 14 Geo Mason L Rev (forthcoming Spring 1992).
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writes the rules for each transaction set, including the relevant glossaries or
dictionaries. ' 2
As a result of standardizing the placement and the contents of the text, a
typical EDI transaction set contains segments that convey the data pertinent
to the message (referred to as "data" segments) and segments that control
their location, safety, and integrity (referred to as "control" segments). The
following English translation of an EDI purchase order illustrates the manner
in which the data and control segments interact:' 3
(1) "This is a purchase order."
(This message, which can act as both a control and data segment, can
be spelled out or summarized using an assigned standardized
message type and number.)
(2) "This purchase order belongs to this particular transmission."
(EDI creates and enters the number assigned to the transaction set in
question. This is a control segment.)
(3) "This purchase order has a designated number of segments init.''
(EDI calculates and enters the number of segments in this
transaction set. This is a control segment.)
(4) "The number of items ordered in this purchase order is .
(EDI calculates how many items this purchase order contains. This is
a control segment.)
(5) "This is item 1 . . "
(This is the first data segment as it specifies the stock number of the
item(s) ordered.)
(6) "The quantity of item 1 ordered is ... "
(This is a data segment.)
(7) "The price we are willing to pay for item 1 is.....
(This is a data segment.)
It is noteworthy that the transition in some control-to-data segments (as
among segments (1), (2), (4), and (5)) is almost imperceptible. An equally
subtle transition occurs when the rules that govern the use of the EDI as a
communication medium give way to those that govern the legal consequences
of the EDI message. Once a given transaction set has been properly labeled
or identified, as in segment (1) above, and the appropriate segments have
been inserted, the message becomes a distinct obligational unit and will be
acted upon by the recipient as if it were, for example, a standard paper-based
purchase order or a request for the confirmation of an irrevocable letter of
credit. Segment (1) thus plays the key role in bringing about the transition
from an electronic medium of communication to a legally binding message. The
"magic" words (or code) are "this is a purchase order" or "this is a request
12. In the United States, the EDI Standards Committee operates under the auspices of the Data
Interchange Standards Association, located in Alexandria, Virginia.
13. The sequel in the principal text is based largely on the illustration provided by Morrison, The
Statute of Frauds Online (cited in note 11).
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for confirmation of an irrevocable letter of credit," for these words imply that
the message entails all the consequences normally attributable to an
equivalent paper-based message.14
2. EDI Rules: Medium and Transaction. EDI transactional rules are
concerned with the binding effect of a message upon an issuer, a recipient,
and any other parties who receive or rely upon the message. Where
documentary credits are concerned, the UCP are the universally observed
transactional rules. In contrast, EDI medium rules address the manner in
which standardized electronic messages have to be prepared, entered, sent,
carried, received, acknowledged, and protected by senders, recipients,
carriers, and other intermediaries when communicating effectively and
efficiently. As such, medium rules are rules of diligence in communications-
related conduct.
Given the importance that EDI places upon standardization, it is only
natural that banks should subject themselves to SWIFT's standardized
procedures. Other sources of EDI rules likely to be considered by banks and
nonbanks when communicating with each other are the Model Agreement for
EDI trading partners proposed by the Electronic Messaging Services Task
Force of the American Bar Association ("ABA Model Agreement")15 and the
Uniform Rules of Conduct for Interchange of Trade Data by Teletransmission
("UNCID").16
The ABA Model Agreement was designed for purchase and sale
transactions, and it contains both medium and transactional rules. One of its
most important transactional rules replaces the traditional "mailbox rule" of
communications inter ausentes with one of receipt: "receipt, and not
transmission, determines the legal effect of any message transmitted by EDI
and . . . verification of the transmission is a mandatory element."' 7 In
14. As will be discussed in connection with the problems of automatic incorporation of the UCP
to paperless letter-of-credit messages, many bankers feel that the mere labeling or identification of
the message is insufficient to make it an obligational unit, especially when it reaches a non-network
party, such as the beneficiary of the documentary credit. On this point, see Part I.C. 1.
15. See ABA Report (cited in note 10).
16. UNCID was adopted by the ICC Executive Board at its 51st Session in Paris (Sept 22, 1987),
as ICC Publication N452 (Jan 1988). A number of influential intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations contributed to UNCID. ICC Publication 452 at 6 lists the following:
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"); Special Programme on
Trade Facilitation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD/FALPRO"); Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe ("UN/ECE"); Customs Cooperation Council
("CCC"); Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD"); Commission of
the European Communities ("EC"); International Organization for Standardization ("ISO");
European Insurance Committee ("CEA"); European Council of Chemical Industries Federation
("CEFIC"); Organization for Data Exchange via Teletransmission in Europe ("ODETTE"); Regional
and national trade facilitation organizations such as NORDIPRO (the originator of the UNCID
concept), FINPRO, NCITD (of the United States), SIMPROFRANCE, and SITPRO (of Great
Britain).
17. ABA Report at 1667 (cited in note 10). The justification offered by the ABA Task Force is
that the context of the mailbox rule is that of "delayed media" such as mailed writings in which none
of the parties has the ability to verify receipt of the message in a timely fashion. By contrast, the ABA
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addition, the ABA Model Agreement imposes upon the recipient-offeree the
obligation "upon proper receipt, to promptly and properly transmit in return
a message verifying receipt of the original [d]ocument."' I This verification
has its own format called a "functional acknowledgment."' 9 Failure to
provide this functional acknowledgment is a violation of the model agreement
"for which the receiving party may be liable in damages." 20
UNCID is a less ambitious set of medium rules. It expressly disclaims
application to the underlying transaction, to which it refers as the "substance
of the trade data transfers." 2' It prescribes rules of conduct for the parties to
an EDI transmission, but solely to attain the most effective possible
communication of the message. UNCID rules are couched in didactic,
nonmandatory language and leave the determination of the legal
consequences of the transmission to official law. Thus the parties are urged to
check the correctness of the transmission and reception, 22 and are provided
with a list of message components that includes the identities of sender and
recipient and the means of verifying the formal completeness and authenticity
of the transfer. 23
Unlike the ABA Model Agreement, UNCID does not specify the moment
of effectiveness or "establishment" of the sender's obligation and leaves the
acknowledgment of receipt to the parties' agreement. 24 Moreover, instead of
specifying the remedial consequences of a recipient's inaction, UNCID advises
the recipient that he will not be authorized to act on the message until he has
complied with the sender's request of verification. The studious avoidance of
remedial language and the determination to stay within the confines of
medium rules is apparent in one of UNCID's key provisions: 25
If the sender has not received the stipulated acknowledgement within a reasonable or
stipulated time, he should take action to obtain it. If despite such action, an
acknowledgement is not received within a further period of reasonable time, the
sender should advise the recipient accordingly by using the same means as in the first
transfer or other means if necessary and, if he does so, he is authorized to assume that
the original transfer has not been received.
3. The SWIFT Network. A SWIFT message originates from a network user-
for example, the bank issuing the letter of credit-and is communicated to the
Task Force relied on section 64 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 64 (1981), which "specifically acknowledges the use of technology in communication in
the form of telephone or other medium of substantially instantaneous two-way communication and
sets forth the principle that communications using those technologies are governed by the same
principles that apply when the parties are in the presence of each other." ABA Report at 1666-67
(cited in note 10) (citations omitted).
18. ABA Report at 1669 (cited in note 10).
19. Id.
20. Id at 1670.
21. See UNCID art 1.
22. See id art 5.
23. Id art 6.
24. Article 7(a) of UNCID states: "The sender of a transfer may stipulate that the recipient
should acknowledge receipt thereof.
25. Id art 7(b).
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nearest SWIFT access point, one of which is located within most member
countries. From the SWIFT access point, the message is routed to the
regional processor, where validation of the message is performed. From the
regional processor, the message is routed to the main switching or operating
center. 26 From the operating center, the message is routed along a reverse
path to the receiving bank-that is, from the operating center, through the
regional processor, through the SWIFT access point, to the receiving bank.
The technology of message switching requires the ability to receive the
electronic message, store it until the proper outgoing circuit and stations are
available, and then retransmit it toward its destination. Computers are often
used to perform the switching function.
Since SWIFT messages are transmitted on SWIFT's own dedicated
telephone and international data transmission lines (referred to in SWIFT's
rules as PTTs), 27 they arrive at the receiving banks almost instantaneously.
SWIFT, unlike fund transfer systems such as the Clearing House Interbank
Payment System ("CHIPS"), is only a medium for the transmission of
financial messages and does not effect settlements of letters of credit or other
types of indebtedness among the issuing and receiving banks-that is, SWIFT
does not serve as a clearinghouse. Thus in CHIPS, the computer tabulates
the debits and credits of each participating bank and at the end of each day
reports their individual net balances.2 8 In SWIFT, however, the settlement of
letter-of-credit transactions is left to the participating banks' separate
arrangements, with each bank debiting or crediting the other bank's "nostro"
or "vostro" account to reflect the completion of each transaction. 29
Currently, close to 2,000 banks and other financial institutions in seventy
countries and 3,000 destinations worldwide rely on SWIFT's global
26. SWIFT currently has two operating centers-one located in Zouterwoude in the
Netherlands, and the other in Culpepper, Virginia. This information and the preceding description
of the routing process was provided by Mr. John Pritt, Standards Manager for SWIFT, in a telefaxed
message dated May 3, 1991 ("Pritt Letter") (on file with the Documentation Center of the University
of Arizona College of Law). Information was also provided by Carl Brickman, former North
American area manager of SWIFT, in a telephone interview April 11, 1990 ("Brickman Interview").
27. A "dedicated line" is a communication line whose sole purpose is for the quick transfer of
computer data for the exclusive use of an individual entity or trade group. These lines can be leased
from the telephone company, or they can be part of a private communications network. Line
dedication can result in cost savings and in an increased level of security. SWIFT's dedicated lines
usually carry messages by what is known as "Packet Switching." Packet switching is designed for
transmission of messages in a fixed (usually small) number of characters, as opposed to a
transmission of messages of indeterminate length. The communication channels that carry the
packets are connected only for the duration of the packet's transmission. Packet switching, therefore,
can be very economical and requires terse messages and standardized transmission procedures. This
feature explains SWIFT's continuous emphasis on reducing the length of its messages. On
dedicated lines, see Webster's New World Dictionary of Computer Terms 98 (3d ed 1988) ("Webster's").
28. See note 91 for Judge Broderick's description of a typical CHIPS transaction.
29. A nostro account in banking parlance means the foreign currency account that the bank
effecting a transfer of funds has with its correspondent bank. Thus a U.S. bank A transferring letter-
of-credit funds to a French bank B may instruct the latter to debit A's French franc nostro account.
Conversely, a vostro account refers to the U.S. dollar account held with A by B. On this procedure,
see Note, New SWIFT Rules on the Liability of Financial Institutions for Interest Losses Caused By Delay in
International Fund Transfers, 13 Cornell Intl LJ 311, 312 (1980) (authored by David W. Ambrosia).
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telecommunications network to transmit more than a million messages a day,
many of which involve letters of credit and bank guarantees.3
0
4. Components of the SWIFT Letter-of-Credit Message; The Self-Sufficient Obligational
Unit. SWIFT's success is due, among other reasons, to its development of
comprehensive and uniform standards for the formulation and
communication of banking financial messages.3 ' The system has been
developed by creating certain message types, each of which corresponds to a
different SWIFT transaction. At the present time, SWIFT has nine message
types, and English is the lingua franca for the formulation of SWIFT's
messages. When drafting a letter-of-credit message, an issuing bank usually
includes certain standard English language terms such as "irrevocable,
documentary credit," "c.i.f" or "f.o.b," "on board, no transhipment bills of
lading," and "payable to any drawers or bona fide holders of drafts." Once
the appropriate terms are selected, SWIFT software translates the terms into
mathematical symbols and compresses, encrypts, and, where required,
authenticates the message.
The message-as does any other EDI message-capsulizes the
obligational language and tells the recipient, "This is the issuance of a
documentary credit" (Message Type 700/701), "This is a pre-advice of a
documentary credit" (Message Type 705), "This is an advice of a third bank's
documentary credit" (Message Type 710/711), or "This is a transfer of a
documentary credit" message. The binding nature as well as the scope of the
sender's obligation differ from message to message. Thus, if the message of
issuance of an irrevocable credit binds the issuer and contains all the terms
and conditions of the documentary credit, the pre-advice message provides
only a nonbinding brief description of the credit with an indication that full
details will follow. If the advice of a third bank's documentary credit merely
notifies the receiver of the terms of the credit without engaging the advising
bank's liability, however, the message of transfer binds its issuer to reimburse
the bank that made the credit available in whole or in part to the transferee or
second beneficiary of the credit.
Some SWIFT messages do more than communicate a binding or
nonbinding promise; they are the very performance promised in the
previously or concomitantly issued message. For example, when an issuer of
Message Type 740 authorizes reimbursement of claims for payments or
negotiations, he performs what he promised in his message of issuance and
request for negotiation or payment. Thus, on the whole, SWIFT letter-of-
credit messages can be regarded as self-sufficient obligational units in the
sense that neither the issuance of a letter of credit nor the requests or
authorizations for its advice, confirmation, negotiation, or payment is the
result of bilateral contracts between the issuing bank and the recipient(s) of
30. See SWIFT Standards, a Product Portfolio.
31. The Payments Working Group, other groups within SWIFT, and member banking
associations periodically review and create the different segments of data that create a SWIFT.
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the SWIFT message. The recipient of a SWIFT letter-of-credit message does
not need to signify his acceptance of the request for advice or of the
authorization for negotiation or payment. He must only comply with the
request or perform the authorized act, and he will be entitled to the issuer's
reimbursement. Furthermore, the fact that the paperless credit promise and
its performance are often issued either simultaneously or within a very short
time span should be noted because, as will be discussed below in connection
with the legal nature of the paperless credit, such immediate liquidity is
usually associated only with the receipt of money or of highly "monetized"
promises.
a. Security devices. SWIFT relies on a complex set of security devices,
some of which (such as authentication) have acquired considerable legal
significance. These security devices have been sufficiently effective to prevent
outsiders from breaking into the system.3 2 Some security devices ensure that
the message received by the receiving bank is the same as that sent by the
issuing bank. These devices include "log in" procedures, application-
selection procedures, message numbering, error checking, and control of
access at processors and system control centers.33 SWIFT also retains
records of transactions, including the full text of each message, and maintains
a system log for a number of months.3 4
Other security features are also built into the layout of the SWIFT
message. For example, an issuing bank must enter its address, that of the
receiving bank, and the message type number. In payment messages, the
amount and date when the funds are to be at the disposal of the receiver must
also be entered. Finally, SWIFT relies upon encryption and authentication.
To encrypt means to encode or scramble a message in such a way as to make it
unintelligible without decoding or unscrambling, which is decryption.3 5
SWIFT encrypts all of its messages.3 6 When transmitting to the regional
32. According to the Pritt Letter (cited in note 26), no breaches of the system had been reported
until May 1991.
33. See SWIFT Rule 22.1.1.
34. Id. Some of these security features-such as the "log in" procedures-depend upon acts by
the users. Other security features are built into the messages-such as the highly uniform formats
and the self-auditing capabilities. SWIFT messages are self-audited by devices such as "headers"
and "trailers" to help detect message invalidity and extraordinary use patterns. The "header" is the
part of the message that contains the information that directs the message to its destination and can
be used in the authentication process. The "trailer" is a special data item located at the end of the
message or the end of a list of items used to determine whether the message was sent according to
the number of characters received as well as the presence of certain key words and addresses. Some
trailers indicate whether the delivery of a message has been delayed for some reason or whether the
receiving bank has received duplicate messages. A typical SWIFT message contains numerous
trailers. On headers and trailers, see generally Webster's at 370 (cited in note 27); see also James V.
Vergari, Latent Legal Repercussions in Electronic Financial Services and Transactions, 5 Comp LJ 177, 202
(1984-85).
35. Encryption is the process of coding or garbling information so its true content and nature is
masked from those who are unauthorized to see it. See Webster's at 132 (cited in note 27).
Decryption is the process of decoding or degarbling information so its true content and nature is
revealed to those who are authorized to see it. Id.
36. Pritt Letter (cited in note 26).
[Vol. 55: No. 3
THE PAPERLESS LETTER OF CREDIT
processor, an issuing bank has the option of encrypting the message, thereby
minimizing the possibility of alteration or interference. If the issuing bank
encrypts the message, the regional processor first decrypts it and checks it for
validity and then reencrypts it and sends it to the operating center, which in
turn forwards it to the regional processor and SWIFT access point of the
receiving bank. The message is decrypted only when it leaves the SWIFT
network, 37 although the receiving bank may decide to have the message
reencrypted for use in further messaging.
The authentication of a message is effected by the use of an algorithm or
mathematical formula that calculates the contents of a message from header
to trailer. The authenticator key contains the algorithm. The issuing bank's
computer-based terminal on its own-that is, not relying on a SWIFT-
supplied device or software-computes the contents of the message and
compiles a result based on the number of characters and data fields. At the
regional processor, as part of the message validation process, SWIFT
ascertains whether the message type requires authentication. If it does,
SWIFT checks the authentication trailer. It is important to note that SWIFT
does not check for more than the number of characters in the authenticator.
Additional authentication checks are performed by the issuing and receiving
banks themselves.38 The results arrived at by both the receiving and issuing
banks must match. If they do not match, a fraudulent and unauthorized use of
the system coupled with data manipulation may be occurring.3 9 Because of
their large value and vulnerability, letter-of-credit messages (SWIFT Category
7) must all be authenticated.
b. Other components: system, category, group, type, field, and character.
SWIFT's system of communication relies on an elaborate classification of
messages and component parts. Each message belongs to a "category," a
37. Id; Brickman Interview (cited in note 26).
38. Pritt Letter (cited in note 26). SWIFT Rule 22.1.2.2 makes it clear that Swift users are
responsible for the exchange of authenticator keys and for insuring the correct authentication of
messages. SWIFT aids its users by providing them with an authenticating algorithm and by
"checking that the authenticator is present in the specified categories of messages."
39. Although SWIFT has never been breached by unauthorized users, it changed its algorithm.
The old algorithm required authenticator keys that were 16 characters long; this gave a four-
character authentication result. The new algorithm is 32 characters long and gives an eight-character
authentication result. The prior algorithm was Data Encryption Standard ("DES") based. DES is a
method of data protection developed by IBM and accepted by the National Bureau of Standards that
uses a single "private key" to encrypt data. Webster's at 88 (cited in note 27). The new algorithm is
not DES-based. This worries banks in the United States because they are not convinced that the new
algorithm is as secure as the old algorithm even with the doubled authentication result. Despite the
reservations of U.S. banks, the new algorithm was implemented during the second quarter of 1991.
Banks that use SWIFT are required to maintain individual authenticators for each of their
correspondent banks. Many banks have requested that SWIFT manage the authenticator algorithms
for the user banks as a separate business, and SWIFT may very well do so. SWIFT is currently
contemplating the use of "Smart Cards" for password authentication in the login process, especially
for the exchange of authenticator keys. Smart Cards provide computational ability; each card carries
its own microprocessor. On these cards, see Donald I. Baker & Roland E. Brandel, 2 The Law of
Electronic Fund Transfer Systems 9-1, 9-2 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2d ed 1988).
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conception that is broad enough to include "system" messages4 0-that is,
messages between a user and SWIFT, including the all-important
"Undelivered Message Report" (Message Type 082). Within each category,
there are "groups" of messages, such as "73n" for "advices" of Category 7
messages. Having been classified as a numerical group, any advice of a letter
of credit will contain the same elements. Groups, in turn, are divided into
types, each of which contains the data generally associated with a specific,
commonly used message. Message Type 732, for example, advises that
documents received with discrepancies have been taken up by the negotiating
or paying bank. Its numbers indicate its affiliation with Category 7 and with
Group 73n.4 1
Each message type contains data fields, which are discrete groups of
characters placed in generally the same location as they would be if they were
sections or segments in the paper-based documents used as models for each
message type.42 The space of the message contained in each data field (or the
number of characters per data field) is also allocated in a manner consistent
with, or at least proportional to, the customary space allocation in paper-
based credits or credit-related messages. It should be noted that in order to
remain functional, cost effective, and secure, SWIFT imposes and abides by
rigorous space limitations. Thus when an issuing bank transmits a SWIFT
message, the regional processor will reject it if the issuer has exceeded the
number of characters allotted to the field.
40. These system messages are designated with a 0 (zero) prefix, and each category bears its
own number. For example, Category 7 covers letters of credit and bank guarantees.
41. SWIFT User Handbook, Standards 3-Trade Finance, 1.0 to 2-4 (1989). Category 7 has
seven group messages and twenty-two message types. A message type has a set of standard
information broken down into small units of information referred to as fields. A data field is "a
single piece of information, the smallest unit normally manipulated by a data base management
system." Webster's at 145 (cited in note 27). To illustrate, while a telephone directory can be
regarded as a database, a telephone listing would be a record, and the telephone number is the data
field.
42. Message Type 700 (the operative credit instrument of the letter-of-credit transaction) is
divided into 34 fields and Message Type 701 into five additional fields. Each field of information is
tagged by an assigned number in accordance with "field specifications." A field tag is merely an
English language description of what the SWIFT field contains. A field specification is a detailed
description of the field's scope. These specifications are numbered and coded, although the
numbers are not always in sequential order. Whether the field specifications within a message are
mandatory depends upon the nature of the information they contain. If, for example, the message
type is Message Type 700, a numbered field identifies the species of documentary credit being
issued. Other fields identify the credit number, date of issue, date and place of expiry, applicant's
bank, applicant's name or designation, beneficiary's name and designation, currency of issuance,
description of the goods, type of shipment, and so on. Each of these fields is assigned a space in the
letter-of-credit layout that contains a limited number of characters. If the data of the operative credit
instrument conveyed by Message Type 700 exceed the maximum input message length, the
additional data can be conveyed by Message Type 701 messages, as long as the total number of
Message Type 701 messages does not exceed three. See SWIFT User Handbook ch 4 at 4.1. At the
present time, the total length of SWIFT messages (in both SWIFT I and SWIFT II versions) is 2,000
characters. Pritt Letter (cited in note 26). Each character corresponds to a letter of the alphabet. At
the end of 1992 (the time when all SWIFT I users are expected to switch to SWIFT II), the letter-of-
credit message length may be increased to 10,000 characters. Id. This enlargement should facilitate
the use of fields, such as "description of the goods" and "additional terms and conditions," whose
size, at present, seem too small.
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5. Transmission Procedure. Banks usually assign the task of sending SWIFT
messages to a designated computer or group of computers. Consequently,
while the letter-of-credit text may be prepared in any computer, it must be
transmitted internally to a computer that contains SWIFT software and an
appropriate modem. As was described earlier,43 an issuing bank routes a
message through the SWIFT access point to the regional processor. The
regional processor acknowledges the message, which means not only that it
has been received but also that it meets SWIFT standards of messaging and
will be delivered as sent. This acknowledgment, therefore, presupposes that
the issuing bank's message was authenticated and decrypted and that SWIFT
assumes the obligation of delivery to the receiving bank (usually an advising
or confirming bank in letter-of-credit transactions), while controlling the
storage and retrieval of the message.44
SWIFT's control over each message and its ability to identify messages
sequentially enable the receiving bank to detect a loss or duplication of the
message.45 Though most messages are delivered within one to two minutes
of being entered into the issuing bank's SWIFT-dedicated computer, if a
message is detained and cannot be delivered during a given period, SWIFT
automatically sends an "Undelivered Message Report" to the sending bank.46
The maximum amount of time delivery could take is approximately two hours.
After a receiving bank receives the message, the receiving bank or a third bank
can credit or pay a beneficiary on the specified pay date. 47
Receiving banks are required to keep their computer terminals logged into
the SWIFT system for at least seven hours on normal working days between 8
a.m. and 6 p.m. 48 In order to use the system, a receiving bank must have a
computer or group of computers equipped with SWIFT software, including
43. See text accompanying note 26.
44. Brickman Interview (cited in note 26).
45. SWIFT requires that a receiver bank check each message sequentially as it arrives or in
accordance with an output-sequence-number. See Byler & Baker, 17 J World Trade L at 461 (cited
in note 8). On network correspondents, see also Baker & Brandel, 2 The Law of Electronic Fund
Transfer Systems § 29.02 at 29-6 (cited in note 39).
46. The most common cause of undelivered messages is that the receiving bank is off-line and
the message cannot be delivered. Brickman Interview (cited in note 26).
47. Since SWIFT has adopted the UCP's letter-of-credit terminology, the party requesting the
transmission of a SWIFT message is referred to as the "applicant," the bank sending the message is
referred to as the "issuing bank," the person entitled to draw on the letter of credit or bank
guarantee is the "beneficiary," and the bank that advises the credit is the "advising" bank, as
distinguished from a bank that adds its own confirmation, which is referred to as the "confirming"
bank. Another bank frequently mentioned in SWIFT letter-of-credit messages is the "reimbursing
bank," which authorizes the issuing bank to grant reimbursement of payment(s) or negotiation(s)
under a documentary credit. Thus, advising, confirming, and reimbursing banks can all be
"receiving" banks of SWIFT messages.
48. SWIFT Rule 21.3. This requirement allows banks from all over the world to send messages
during their own business hours and still accommodate other countries' business hours. It also
prevents backlogs because a SWIFT message must promptly be passed through to a designated
receiver. If the communication lines are closed, the SWIFT message is required to wait until the
lines open up. In such a case, the sending bank receives information on the undelivered message in
the daily Undelivered Message Report. SWIFT software checks the message flow and identities of
users logged on to the system; if the SWIFT software locates a terminal which does not log in within
the designated period of time, then a report is sent to "oversight" personnel for corrective action.
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software to render the SWIFT message readable in "plain" or "safety"
(individualized) paper formats. Once the receiving bank has received and
checked the message, it must report to the issuing bank so that the latter can
ascertain that its message was received. 49 SWIFT-compatible software
enables the receiving bank's clerk to convert the SWIFT message into a
customary paper-based letter of credit. Depending upon the nature of the
message, it may be transcribed in whole or relevant part. In the case of partial
transcription, the transcribed text will be typed or printed on the receiving
bank's stationery, together with whatever additional text the receiving bank
inserts on its own. Upon conversion, then, the message will be sent out as a
mail, cable, or telex operative credit instrument. Alternatively, the message
may be rekeyed into a SWIFT format and sent out again as a SWIFT message.
Some banks rely on SWIFT-compatible software to send the printout of the
SWIFT message directly to the beneficiary without alteration and conversion
into the receiving bank's paper-based format. This printout is also intended
to function as the operative credit instrument.
The transition from a SWIFT to a nonSWIFT medium in this direct or
unconverted method of transmission is not as trouble-free as it seems. Since
the SWIFT message is not intended for use by beneficiaries, it may either
contain directives that only banks need follow or lack clauses on which
beneficiaries need to rely. As will be discussed shortly, these transitional
problems have caused considerable uncertainty among bankers and banking
lawyers.
6. Time of Establishment. In light of the speed with which SWIFT messages
are communicated and the receiving bank's need to act quickly in response to
the electronic request or instruction, the receiving bank must know as of what
moment the sender of the message is irrevocably bound. Article 5 of the UCC
refers to this event as "establishment" 50 and, almost uniquely, lays down
specific rules by which it may be determined-a matter as to which even the
UCP are silent.5 1
The establishment of the paperless letter of credit could occur at various
times. The first time could be when the SWIFT message is released to the
SWIFT access point, the second when the message is acknowledged by the
receiving bank, and the third when the receiving bank performs the requested
or instructed act. Other moments of establishment are conceivable, such as
when the message actually reaches the recipient's "operations" computer (as
distinguished from a mere "host" or "depository" computer), when the
recipient's operations officers gain knowledge of the existence of the message,
or when the message is received by the beneficiary. Yet none of these
moments is sufficiently objectively ascertainable to warrant consideration.
49. Brickman interview (cited in note 26).
50. See UCC § 5-106 (West, 12th ed 1990).
51. See generally Kozolchyk, 9 Intl Encyclopedia Comparative L ch 5 at 104-10 (cited in note 5).
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Virtually every American and European banker interviewed by this writer
pointed to the moment of release of the message as the moment when he
deemed his liability established vis- -vis correspondent banks. 52  This
moment usually coincides with the time the issuing bank records its liability
and any other debits or credits related to the message in question. As a result
both of regulatory requirements and of electronic programs that carry out the
bank's issuance of credits and related bookkeeping functions, this recording
(also known as "booking") occurs in conjunction with and immediately
following release.
The bankers' choice of an ascertainable early moment of establishment
performs an additional, nonbookkeeping function. It reassures the recipient-
correspondent bank that the advice, confirmation, negotiation, or payment of
an irrevocable credit will not be revoked or canceled without its recipient's
consent. Thus, if an issuer attempts to revoke or cancel its instruction or
request after the receiving bank has complied with it, the receiving bank does
not have to prove that it advised, confirmed, paid, or negotiated prior to the
issuer's attempted revocation or cancellation. Proof of the advice,
confirmation, negotiation, or payment will suffice to bind the issuing bank.
The SWIFT User Handbook does not state when a credit is established.
Instead, these rules assure the issuer that messages not yet "delivered" to the
intended recipient can be revoked or canceled. 53 Let us assume, however,
that issuer A sent a message requesting advising bank B to forward to
beneficiary C a "pre-advice" of a credit. In a subsequent phone conversation,
A's employee indicated to bank B that he had just sent the text of the
operative credit instrument to SWIFT, that the terms and conditions of the
52. This information was obtained in response to a 1971 questionnaire sent to banks in several
countries in connection with writing Kozolchyk, 9 Intl Encyclopedia Comparative L (cited in note 5).
The questionnaire and replies thereto are filed in the libraries of the University of Arizona College of
Law and the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Law in Hamburg. The questionnaire
and related interviews have been updated for the fall 1992 projected publication by Little, Brown &
Company of Kozolchyk, On Letters of Credit. See also State of New York Law Revision Commission, 1
Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, Memoranda presented to the Commission and
Stenographic Report of Public Hearing on Article 5 of the Code item 3 at 55 (reprint at 603) (1954 &
photo reprint 1980), especially written testimony before the committee by Mr. John L. O'Halloran of
Manufacturers Trust Co., stating that "once we have mailed that letter of credit, as far as I am
personally concerned, the credit has been established." See also corroborating findings by Professor
Schlesinger cited in Boris Kozolchyk, Is Present Letter of Credit Law Up to its Task?, 8 George Mason U L
Rev 285, 297-98 n19 (1986), and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit findings on the
irrevocability of CHIP's messages transferring funds once the message of transfer was released in
Delbrueck v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir 1979). But compare UCC
§ 4A-211 (a)-(c) & comment 3. Article 10c of the proposed revision of article 10 of the UCP states in
relevant part:
Unless the Nominated Bank is the Confirming Bank, nomination by the Issuing Bank does
not constitute any undertaking by the Nominated Bank to pay, to accept, or to negotiate.
Except where expressly agreed to by the Nominated Bank and so communicated to the
Beneficiary, the Nominated Bank's receipt and/or examination and/or forwarding of the
documents does not make that bank liable to pay, to accept, or to negotiate.
See ICC Doc 470-37/4 (June 10, 1991).
53. SWIFT Rule 22.4.2.5 states: "The sender has the ability to cancel a message before the first
delivery attempt is made. The system will abort a message after eleven unsuccessful delivery
attempts and will inform the sender."
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message were exactly those of the pre-advice message, and that B should
advise the irrevocable credit to the beneficiary immediately. Yet after A
released its message of issuance to SWIFT but before the message reached B,
A asked SWIFT to revoke or cancel the message of issuance, and SWIFT
revoked or canceled it. This revocation or cancellation occurred after that
moment when bankers feel they are irrevocably bound not only by their
message of issuance, but also with respect to a pre-advised credit. And the
consensus among banks and banking lawyers-now expressed in the
proposed revision of the UCP-is that a pre-advice irrevocably binds the
issuing bank to issue the operative credit instrument "without delay."'54
7. SWIFT: Medium or Transactional Rules? The contrast between SWIFT
rules and the banking practices on revocability or cancellation of letter-of-
credit messages helps to identify SWIFT's type of rules. As is the case with
UNCID, many of the SWIFT rules are what was referred to earlier as
"medium" rules and also to what Professors Goode and Bergsten refer to as
"system" rules. 55 In this writer's opinion, system rules are a species in the
genus of medium rules. Like other medium rules, system rules are designed
54. Subsection "a" of article 11 of the proposed revision of the UCP reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
i. When an Issuing Bank instructs an Advising Bank by any authenticated teletransmission
to advise a Credit or an amendment to a Credit, the teletransmission will be deemed to
be the operative Credit instrument or the operative amendment, and no mail
confirmation should be sent. Should a mail confirmation nevertheless be sent, it will
have no effect and the Advising Bank will have no obligation to check such mail
confirmation against the operative Credit instrument or the operative amendment
received by teletransmission.
ii. If the teletransmission states "full details to follow" (or words of similar effect) or states
that the mail confirmation is to be the operative Credit instrument or the operative
amendment, then the teletransmission will not be deemed to be the operative Credit
instrument or operative amendment. The Issuing Bank must forward the operative
Credit instrument or the operative amendment to such Advising Bank without delay.
c. A preliminary advice of the issuance or amendment of a Credit (pre-advice) shall only
be given by an Issuing Bank if such bank is prepared to issue the operative Credit
instrument or amendment thereto. An Issuing Bank having given such pre-advice shall
be irrevocably committed to issue or amend the Credit without delay.
ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice, Working Party Report-UCP 400 Revision 19,
ICC Doc 470-37/4 (1991).
55. Bergsten and Goode insightfully distinguish between system and transaction rules, but also
point out that whether such rules impose legal responsibilities on transmitters, recipients, and the
system itself depends upon their purpose and interpretation. Some system rules exclude liability of
the system for breakdown or malfunction, while others are silent on the question of responsibility.
Bergsten and Goode conclude that:
While system rules are not directly concerned with the underlying trade transaction, they
have an indirect effect, in that a communication transmitted through the system may prove
legally ineffective in achieving its contractual purpose if the sender fails to conform to the
system rules. Conversely, successful transmission through the system will normally result in
contractually effective communication. The potential existence of a link between systems
rules and transaction rules is clearly brought out in that part of the SWIFT Handbook
dealing with the electronic transmission of documentary credits. "A documentary credit
advised to the beneficiary or another advising bank based on a Swift message constitutes an
operative credit instrument unless otherwise specified."
Eric Bergsten & Roy M. Goode, in Hans B. Thomsen & Bernard S. Wheble, eds, Trading with EDI ch
7 at 125, 134 (1989).
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to instill diligence in the effective use of the electronic medium. Unlike
medium rules, however, which apply to an open-ended number of users,
system rules apply only to the participants in a given system or network of
telecommunications. Finally, and most importantly, unlike transactional
rules, medium and system rules should not confer rights or impose duties
with respect to the underlying "messaged" transaction. The SWIFT rule that
allows revocation or cancellation prior to delivery of the message confuses its
mission. It is not supposed to confer a power of revocation or cancellation of
the underlying message; only the UCP or applicable statutory, decisional, or
administrative law can confer such a power. SWIFT's rule, therefore, should
be solely to inform users that if applicable law allows revocation or
cancellation, SWIFT has the capability of effecting such up to a certain
moment.
8. Rules on Liability.
a. Negligence and fraud. The risk of a negligent or fraudulent
transmission is shared by SWIFT and its users. SWIFT's own liability for
negligence and fraud is guided by one major principle and several corollaries.
The major principle is that SWIFT is not liable for any segment of the
teletransmission not directly under its control. 56 Thus SWIFT is responsible
for the maintenance of security in the part of the system that it controls-that
is, the regional processors, operating centers, communication facilities, and
transmission lines between and among the regional processors and the
operating centers. 57 SWIFT is not responsible, however, for the security of
the communications facilities and transmission lines between and among the
regional processors and the users' computer terminal facilities or for the
security of the users' premises and terminal facilities. Security within these
premises and facilities is the responsibility of the users. 58
Corollaries of the area-of-control principle are:
56. See SWIFT Rule 21.5.1, which states:
SWIFT is responsible for the complete international network. Looking at it from the user's
point of view, this means that SWIFT is responsible for the message from the time it reaches
SWIFT owned equipment (generally the digital port on the regional processor) to the time
it leaves SWIFT owned equipment .... In the part of the system controlled by SWIFT,
SWIFT is responsible for the maintenance of security as decided by the Board of Directors
and detailed in the Policy Volume. This part of the System is limited to the regional
processor's (including the gateway), Slice Processors and System Control Centers,
communication facilities and transmission lines between the regional processor's, the Slice
Processors and the System Control Processor.
57. Id.
58. See, among others, SWIFT Rule 21.5.1 (last paragraph) which states:
SWIFT does not accept responsibility for the security of any communication facilities and
transmission lines between the regional processor's and the users' terminal facilities, or for
the security relating to the user's premises or terminal facilities or the use thereof.
See also Rule 22.1.2.1, which states:
Once an LT (logical terminal) has been authorized for access to the SWIFT system, it is the
user who is responsible for control of its use. This control includes allocation of input
sequence numbers and the checking of output sequence numbers. It also includes keeping
the log-in and select sequences secure for every logical terminal, and using them correctly.
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(1) SWIFT is not responsible for loss or damage caused by a
technical failure or force majeure; 59
(2) SWIFT is not responsible for an unauthorized transmission
unless the victim proves that SWIFT could not reasonably have
assumed the validity of the transmission;60
(3) SWIFT is empowered to use any reputable third party with
regard to the transmission of messages;6 1
(4) SWIFT is not responsible for unauthenticated payments or
transfers, whatever the category or type of message, or for the
negligence of a user or lack of cooperation between users, or for the
users' failure to follow Handbook procedures when such failure is
"an essential element in the events leading to the loss or damage
incurred;" 62
(5) SWIFT is liable for its negligent acts, errors, or omissions in
failing both to perform the services and to maintain the security
procedures described in the Handbook;63 and
(6) SWIFT is liable for fraud by its employees, subcontractors, and
third parties when acting within the area under SWIFT control.
In the case of third-party fraud, SWIFT bears responsibility only if it could not
have reasonably assumed the validity of the message 64 or if the fraud was
made possible by SWIFT's failure to follow the security procedures outlined
in SWIFT's Handbook.
If SWIFT's negligence or the fraud of its employees, subcontractors, or
third parties acting within SWIFT's area of control is established, SWIFT is
liable only for the users' "direct" losses or damages. 65 Direct losses are
defined as: (1) "a non recoverable loss of funds representing the principal
amount of authenticated payments or transfers, whatever the category or type
of message sent through the SWIFT system and (2) a loss of interest arising
from a loss in (a) above .... -66 SWIFT users are required to "take all action
necessary to keep interest expenses to a minimum, that is, shall take into
59. SWIFT Rule 23.1 states:
The Company shall not be responsible for any loss or damage caused by a failure to carry
out, or delay of messages resulting from a technical failure, unless otherwise provided in the
User Handbook, or force majeure. Force majeure shall include acts of authorities including
PTT authorities, strike or industrial dispute, political disturbance, catastrophes in nature,
fire, war, epidemics and all other circumstances which prevent the Company against its will
from carrying out its activities. Moreover, the Company shall not be responsible for any loss
or damage caused by the performance of non-authorized transmission orders unless the
prejudiced party proves that the company could not reasonably assume the validity of those
orders. The Company shall be entitled to make use of any reputable third party with regard
to the transmission of messages, at the risk of the ordering user.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. SWIFT Rule 23.4.2.
63. Id.
64. SWIFT Rule 23.4.2(c), (d).
65. SWIFT Rule 23.4.2.
66. SWIFT Rule 23.4.1.
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account any undue enrichment." 67 SWIFT limits its liability for direct losses
through fraudulent or dishonest acts by its employees to the sum of three
billion Belgian francs (approximately 1.3 billion dollars) for any one loss or
series of losses arising out of the same event and to six billion Belgian francs
(approximately 2.6 billion dollars) in the aggregate for each annual period.68
A similar limitation applies to liability for errors and omissions and fraud. If
the claims for the above categories exceed the amount available in SWIFT's
annual maximum aggregate liability fund, then the annual maximum
indemnity available will be apportioned among the claimants on the basis of
the amount of messages involved during the year.69 The above limitation is
accompanied by a two million Belgian franc deductible per claim.70
b. Delay and loss of interest. Disputes on the loss of interest on funds not
timely received are common among SWIFT's users. At times, the claim is
caused by a delay in the issuance of the transfer message or in the relay of an
instruction to transfer funds. At other times, the claim is caused by a
recipient's failure to make available the funds transferred in timely fashion. 71
In 1979, SWIFT enacted rules that allocated liability for such interest losses. 72
These rules address the issue of choice of law as well as such substantive law
issues as standard of care and amount of recovery. Belgian law is said to be
applicable to "all relations, including the rights and obligations between
SWIFT and the users." 73 The SWIFT rules also set forth guideposts for the
"time of receipt" of the message,74 "value date,"' 75 and "cut-off time," 76
without which it would be very difficult to allocate liability for loss of interest
because neither the beginning nor the end of the delinquent period could be
established with certainty. 7 7 In claims of loss of interest, the deductible is
67. Id.
68. SWIFT Rule 23.4.3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Swift Board Paper 185, Responsibility and Liability § 2(b) (April 1979) (cited in Note, 13
Cornell L Rev at 315 n29, 320-25 nn69-101 (cited in note 29).
72. SWIFT Rule 22.4 (late payments).
73. SWIFT Rule 23.2.
74. SWIFT Rule 22.4.2.1 states that "[tihe time of receipt of a message at the receiving terminal
shall be the output time as recorded by the regional processor in the application output header. This
is also the time of receipt for cut-off time purposes."
75. According to Rule 22.4.2.2, "[tlhe value date defines the date when the amount of the
transfer is at the disposal of the Receiving User. In SWIFT, the value date is indicated, e.g., in Field
32 ...."
76. SWIFT Rule 22.4.2.3 states that "[clut-off time is the latest time of day (by country/time
zone) for Receiving Users to apply same day value to effect funds transfers in domestic currency in
favor of third parties. Cut-off time for a destination is the cut-off time shown in the
Address/Geographical section of the Swift Directory for location of the destination."
77. Since the late payment could be the responsibility of either SWIFT or of the sender or
receiver of the SWIFT message (SWIFT Rule 22.4. 1), a standard of care had to be established for
each of these participants. SWIFT was made responsible if (1) the message that it acknowledged to
the sender did not appear on the "Undelivered Message Report" and was not delivered; (2) SWIFT
failed to notify a user promptly of a failure on the part of SWIFT personnel; and (3) SWIFT failed to
notify a user promptly of a failure of the SWIFT network. SWIFT Rule 22.4.3. A sender was made
responsible by the SWIFT rules if (1) the message was not acknowledged by SWIFT, and the sender
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100,000 Belgian francs (approximately $30,000) per event of loss or damage.
If the aggregate of loss of interest claims exceeds fifty million Belgian francs,
the reimbursement is on a prorated basis. 78
c. The model for SWIFT liability rules. There is a striking similarity
between the SWIFT rules on liability and the liability rules developed by U.S.
statutory and treaty law at the turn of the twentieth century for losses
resulting from maritime carriage. 79 Echoing the Harter Act and the Hague
Rules, 80 the SWIFT rules allocate liability among the carrier (SWIFT), the
users of the service (sending and receiving banks), and their respective
insurers as if all the parties were joint venturers in a carriage-of-messages
enterprise. Certain risks are borne jointly, others severally. Liability is
allocated once the physical and legal boundaries of responsibility are laid
down. The principle that underlies allocation of liability is that SWIFT, as the
carrier, must be shielded against losses likely to cripple the carriage
enterprise. This principle may not qualify as the "cheapest cost avoider" for
believers in the dogma of economic efficiency, 8 ' but judging from the
mushrooming number of SWIFT users and from the continuing low cost of
the service, it has worked well. Moreover, neither SWIFT nor CHIPS rules
require their systems to assume liability for all losses of principal resulting
from system failure. 82 SWIFT, as indicated earlier, does, however, assume
did not initiate an adequate "reconciliation procedure" to insure receipt of all acknowledgments; (2)
the message was acknowledged by SWIFT and then appeared in the Undelivered Message Report;
(3) SWIFT had not responded prior to the cut-off time at the receiving location to the specific
delivery monitoring instructions requested by the sender; (4) a transaction requiring a SWIFT format
was sent in another format; (5) the sender did not react promptly to SWIFT's notification that a user,
regional processor, or system control center had failed to operate or had a faulty operation; and (6)
the message contained an invalid or wrong address in the header or text. SWIFT Rule 22.4.4. The
receiver was deemed responsible if it (1) did not process by giving appropriate value to messages
validly addressed and received prior to cut-off time; (2) did not react promptly to SWIFT
notifications concerning operational use of the system; (3) failed to perform an adequate
reconciliation to insure receipt of all messages from SWIFT; (4) failed to adhere to the Handbook's
computer Terminal Policy rules or failed to notify SWIFT 24 hours in advance of its inability to
adhere to the Terminal Policy; and (5) failed to follow normal banking practice and did not inquire as
soon as possible about messages that did not comply with the SWIFT standards, did not authenticate
correctly, or contained an address not listed in the SWIFT directory and consequently could not be
processed in the usual manner. SWIFT Rule 22.4.5.
78. SWIFT Rule 23.5.2.
79. See generally Boris Kozolchyk, Evolution and Present State of the Ocean Bill of Lading from a
Banking Law Perspective, 23J Maritime L & Commerce 161 (April 1992).
80. The Harter Act, 27 Star 445 (1893), codified as amended at 46 USC §§ 190-96, and the
Hague Rules, Convention Internationale Pour L'Unification de Certains R~gles en Matihre de
Connaissement Sign~e i Bruxelles, Le 25 Aofit 1924, U.S. Treaty Series No 931, 51 Stat 233 (official
text is French).
81. See, for example, Lingl's evaluation of the cheapest cost avoiding liability rules in SWIFT
and CHIPS rules, as inspired by Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase. Lingl, 22 Harv Intl LJ at 630-
52 (cited in note 8), quoting Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale
U Press, 1972) and Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J L & Econ 1 (1960).
82. Rule 15 of the New York Clearing House Association provides that "[tihe Clearing House
shall not be responsible for any loss in the use of funds resulting from a system error." See Rules
Governing the Clearing House Interbank Payment System (NYCHA, 1981), citing Lingi, 22 Harv Intl LJ at
635 (cited in note 8). Similarly, SWIFT Rule 23.1 states that "[t]he Company shall not be
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liability for interest losses caused by a system or personnel failure.83 In
addition, the SWIFT rules provide an informal arbitration procedure to
handle user claims for recovery of losses or damages rejected by SWIFT.84
The SWIFT rules do not cover the risk created by fluctuating exchange
rates between the time a transfer of funds is initiated and the actual time the
transfer is effected. Some commentators find this a significant coverage
gap. 85 In the absence of a SWIFT rule on the fluctuating exchange risk, under
U.S. law, this risk is likely to continue to be borne by the applicant. 86
B. The SWIFT User Handbook as a Source of Electronic
Letter-of-Credit Law
If a SWIFT letter of credit were to become the subject of litigation, it is
unclear how the court would characterize and rank the SWIFT rules. The
SWIFT User Handbook may be characterized as carrier-promulgated rules
that are binding on only those users of the system who expressly agree to be
bound by them. Alternatively, the SWIFT User Handbook may be regarded
as sufficiently reflecting widespread banking practice to bind all the parties
who participate, directly or indirectly, in the electronic letter-of-credit
transaction, regardless of their expression of consent. And even if the latter
were to become the prevailing characterization, it is still unclear how the
SWIFT User Handbook would rank with respect to the UCP, especially when
the latter cover some of the same issues.
A LEXIS search found no decisional law applying SWIFT rules to SWIFT-
issued letters of credit. 87 The search then turned to decisions dealing with
rules or guidelines promulgated by other systems of interbank
communication. One such decision disclosed is Delbrueck v. Manufacturers
Hanover,88 which involved the binding effect of CHIPS. The Delbrueck court
held that "the practices associated with banking transactions can be
responsible for any loss or damaged caused by failure to carry out, or delay of, message resulting
from technical failure .... "
83. SWIFT Rule 22.4.3.
84. SWIFT Rule 23.3.
85. See Note, 13 Cornell Intl LJ at 325-27 (cited in note 29).
86. See Richard v American Union Bank, 241 NY 163, 168, 149 NE 338, 339 (1925).
87. A LEXIS search of the term SWIFT in U.S. federal and state law libraries produced only one
federal court decision. Lloyds Bank v Lynch, 702 F Supp 157 (ND Ohio, 1988). A similar search in
European LEXIS libraries failed to produce any decision. The libraries searched were: Enggen (for
English decisions), Prive (for French decisions, including Biblio (tous fichiers reunis)), Appel (Cours
d'Appel, July 1983 to Sept 30, 1987), from Oct 1980, Cassci (Cours de Cassation, Chambres autre
que Criminelle, Oct 1959 to March 13, 1991), and Eurcom (for European Community cases from
November 1954 to December 1990). No references to SWIFT were found in German commentaries
such as Baumbach, Duden, Hopt, Handelsgesetzbuch, 26 Auflage 1985 and commercial law
reporters such as Wertpapier-Mitteilungen, or in Italian reporters such as Foro Italiano or journals
such as Banca, Borsa e Titoli di Credito. Argentina, with Latin America's best decisional law
reporting system, has no entries in the alphabetical index of reporters such as La Ley and
Jurisprudencia Argentina. A similar void was apparent in Spain's Repertorio de Jurisprudencia
Aranzadi.
88. 609 F2d 1047 (2d Cir 1979).
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conclusive evidence of the legal effect of those transactions.- 8 9 Hence,
CHIPS rules were given the binding effect accorded to standard banking
practices .90
Delbrueck addresses one of the most important features of electronic
assumption of liability by a bank communicating with another bank. The
plaintiff, a German banking partnership, agreed with Herstatt, a large German
bank, to exchange German marks for U.S. dollars in three separate
remittances of dollars to Herstatt's account with Chase Manhattan Bank
("Chase") in New York. Two remittances were due on June 26, 1974, 2.5
million dollars and 10 million dollars, respectively. Another remittance for 10
million dollars was due on June 27, 1974. In accordance with the
authorization procedure, Delbrueck sent a telex message to the defendant on
June 25, 1974, ordering the transfer, on June 26, of a total of 12.5 million
dollars to Chase for the account of Herstatt. Early in the morning of June 26,
Delbrueck authorized the payment of the 10 million dollars due on June 27.
Herstatt was closed by the German banking authorities around 10:30 a.m. on
June 26. Chase became aware of the closing and froze payments out of
Herstatt's account but continued to accept transfers. Delbrueck sent a telex
message to Manufacturers Hanover Bank at 11:30 a.m. on June 26, requesting
that the 10 million dollars transfer scheduled for June 27 be stopped. A few
minutes later, at 11:36 a.m. and 11:37 a.m., respectively, the defendant
transferred to Chase via CHIPS the 10 million dollars and 2.5 million dollars
ordered by the plaintiff on June 25 and due on the 26th. The plaintiff called
the defendant at around noon and later sent a telex message, trying to stop or
recall the 12.5 million dollars in payments that had already been transferred
to Chase. During that afternoon, both the defendant and the plaintiff made
phone calls to Chase in an attempt to obtain the return of the funds. These
calls were unsuccessful and at 9:00 p.m. of the evening of June 26, Chase
formally credited Herstatt's account with the 12.5 million dollars. 9 1
89. Id at 1051.
90. Id.
91. Judge Broderick's description of the CHIPS process is quite instructive:
When the paying or sending bank (Manufacturers) receives a telex from one of its customers
(Delbrueck) instructing it to make a payment to a receiving bank (Chase), another member
of the CHIPS system, for the account of one of the receiving bank's customers (Herstatt),
the paying bank (Manufacturers) first tests and verifies the telex. Thereafter, the tested and
verified telex is sent to one of the CHIPS computer terminal operators and the payment
order contained in the telex is programmed into the terminal by typing into the computer
the relevant information-i.e., the identifying codes for the party originating the transfer
(Delbrueck), the remitting bank (Manufacturers), the receiving bank (Chase), the party for
whom the receiving bank is receiving the transfer (Herstatt) and the amount of the transfer
($10 million and $2.5 million). This information is then transmitted to the central computer
located at the Clearing House, which, based upon the identifying codes, searches out all the
necessary clerical information, stores the message and causes a sending form to be
automatically typed at the sending bank. In this case, this step was effected on June 25,
1974. Once the programming of the computer has been completed, the send form is sent to
the appropriate area at the sending bank for approval. When a determination is made at the
sending bank (Manufacturers) to make the payment, the form is returned to one of the
computer terminal operators, re-inserted in the computer and the release key is depressed.
At that moment, the central computer at the Clearing House causes a credit ticket to be
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The plaintiff argued that the transfers made by the defendant were
revocable until 9:00 p.m. and that by failing to revoke the transfers, the
defendant had negligently breached its implied creditor-depositor contract
with Delbrueck. As characterized by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, the crucial issue on the appeal was whether the transfers
of funds via CHIPS at 11:36 a.m. and 11:37 a.m. were final. The court held
that the transfers were irrevocable and affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. By examining the CHIPS Manual, the court determined that
CHIPS transfers were intended as replacements of interbank cashiers' checks,
especially in large payments. 92 And since it was undisputed that cashiers'
checks were irrevocable when transferred to the payee bank, the court
concluded that a similar rule should apply to CHIPS transfers. The court
traced the short history of CHIPS revocation rules and established that prior
to the Herstatt bankruptcy, there had obtained a rule of tacit irrevocability
once the transfers were released, except for the correction of clerical errors.
Albeit unwritten, this rule reflected the views of participating banks. The
court also found that plaintiff's conduct reflected recognition of the same
rules in that it initially requested the stop payment only on the 10 million
dollars to be paid onJune 27, "apparently believing that theJune 26 transfers
had been made and were irrevocable." 93 The Herstatt failure caused the
enactment of a new rule to help reduce the backlog of releasing orders owing
to the reluctance of transferor banks to release payment orders until they
were certain that funds were available to cover them. By allowing revocation
up until the moment of crediting the account of the payee, transferor banks
were encouraged to release the mounting number of payment orders. The
new procedure allowed member banks to release payments but gave them the
right to recall these payments until 10:00 a.m. the morning after the transfer.
As pointed out by the court, this change would not have been required if the
transfers were considered revocable by member banks. Consistent with the
practice of issuing irrevocable transfers, CHIPS reverted a few months later,
printed automatically at the terminal of the receiving bank (Chase) and a debit ticket to be
printed at the terminal of the sending bank (Manufacturers). Further, the central computer
automatically makes a permanent record of the transaction and debits the Clearing House
account of the sending bank and credits the Clearing House account of the receiving bank.
In this case, this step was effected at 11:36 and 11:37 for the $10 million and $2.5 million
payment, respectively, from Manufacturers for Delbrueck to Chase for Herstatt.
The funds received by a receiving bank (e.g., Chase) for the account of one of its customers
(e.g., Herstatt) via the receipt of a CHIPS credit message are made available to the
customer and can be drawn upon by the customer in the discharge of its obligations that
same day, as soon as the receiving bank is aware of the fact that the funds have been
received. This running tabulation by the receiving bank is generally referred to as a
"shadow balance."
At the end of the day, the central computer correlates all of the day's transactions, nets out
the debits and credits and prints out reports showing which banks owe money and which
have money due them. That information is delivered to the New York Federal Reserve Bank
the next business day and adjustments are made on the appropriate books of account.
Delbrueck Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 464 F Supp 989, 922 n5 (SD NY 1979).
92. " 'CHIPS completely eliminates checks for interbank payment transfers' (App 377)." 609
F2d at 1050 (citing the CHIPS manual).
93. Id.
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once the backlog problem was resolved, to the initial, tacitly accepted rule of
irrevocability and finality of transfers when they were released.
The Delbrueck decision is significant because it (1) aligns the CHIPS
presumption of irrevocability with that of paper-based and paperless credit
customs; (2) holds that CHIPS practices are conclusive evidence of the legal
effect of CHIPS transfers; and (3) applies CHIPS rules to the plaintiff, a
nonCHIPS member. The court may have relied on the assumption that the
plaintiff, in attempting to stop payment of only the June 27 transfer, evinced
familiarity with CHIPS rules and thus consented to them.94 Alternatively, the
court may have assumed that a banking practice, once set forth in written
form by the association involved, automatically applies to parties such as the
plaintiff, regardless of express consent. Either of these views contrasts
markedly with those of European courts. Commenting on the attitude of
French courts, Christian Gavalda and Jean Stoufflet state that those courts
evidence "considerable prudence when accepting the presence of trade usage,
especially when invoked by a bank against a client" ("Les tribunaux timoignent
d'une assez prudence pour admettre l'existence d'un usage, surtout lorsque cet usage est
opposipar une banque d un client.").95 Thus, according to these writers, a usage
will not be deemed to exist "unless it is a practice known to all and is
uncontested" ("une pratique est connue de tow et n 'est plus contestie"),96 although
the "consecration of trade usage" may come about by a judicial decision.9 7
Similarly, German commentators point out the need for objective as well as
subjective elements in the enforcement of trade usage. Among the objective
elements are the "proof of actual practice" ("Tatsachliche Ubung"), including
its regularity, consistency, and noncoerciveness over a certain period of
time.98 In addition, as a subjective element, German courts require proof of
the parties' awareness of the particular usage.99 Given the unhesitating
application of the CHIPS Manual to a nonCHIPS member by a court as
commercially important as the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, it is necessary to explore further the interaction between the SWIFT
rules and such rules of broader application as those found in the UCP and
UCC.
C. Application of the UCP to SWIFT Credits
1. The Transition to the "Hard Copy" Problem. SWIFT terminology, message
standards, and location and spacing of data fields in letter-of-credit messages
are all inspired by UCP principles and rules.100 This dependency explains the
94. Id.
95. 1 Droit de Credit 51 (Les Institutions, 1990).
96. Id, citing Paris, 6 Dec 1933: Gaz Pal 1934, 1, 122.
97. Id, citing Corn 20 dc 1954, D 1955, J, 83; Trib Corn Nice 3 Nov 1965.
98. See Volker Emmerich, et al, 4 Handelsgesetzbuch app §§ 343-460 (1990) (comment by Horn).
99. Id.
100. As stated in chapter 1 of SWIFT's Handbook: "Applying these principles of the ICC UCP,
the rules and basic text of these message types are given in English .... " Swift User Handbook ch I
at 1-1.
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generic, albeit tacit, incorporation of the UCP into SWIFT credits. SWIFT's
Category 7 first operational guideline is: "Unless otherwise specified, the
Documentary Credit is issued subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits."' 0 Uncertainty as to the application of the UCP to
SWIFT credits arises, however, once a SWIFT credit is printed and delivered
to a beneficiary. It must be asked whether such a "hard copy" (letter, cable,
or telex) of the SWIFT-transmitted letter of credit is the operative credit
instrument where the beneficiary is concerned. If it is the operative credit
instrument, is it subject to the UCP, SWIFT, or a combination of them?
These questions are significant because the hard copy is a literal version of the
SWIFT message, and this message, as indicated earlier, does not expressly
incorporate the UCP. Yet the UCP require that they be expressly
incorporated in the operative credit instrument by providing that the UCP
"shall be incorporated into each documentary credit by wording in the credit
indicating that such credit is issued subject to the [UCP], 1983 revision, ICC
Publication No. 400."102
Some issuing banks use software that warns advising banks to state in its
advice to beneficiaries that the credits are subject to the UCP. Other issuing
banks, however, insist that the express incorporation of the UCP requires
mention of such an incorporation in any teletransmission by their
correspondent banks. These conflicting practices have generated disputes
among banks and banking associations, both of which have asked the ICC
Banking Commission for an advisory opinion. l s Although the Commission
has not provided such an opinion, it has acknowledged that a problem arises
once the message is sent to a beneficiary or to another party outside the
SWIFT network. 10 4 The Commission has also acknowledged that in some
regions, such as the Middle East, banks deem it essential to mention the UCP
in every letter-of-credit text.i05 For this reason, the Commission has
recommended that a short code be included in the SWIFT message type to
print out the UCP incorporation clause. 10 6
Notwithstanding the Banking Commission's recommendation, the
problem has persisted, and the Israeli National Committee has suggested that
in the event the suggested code was not inserted, issuing banks include
language of incorporation on a given data field.i07 In response to the Israeli
suggestion, the Commission was more categorical, and despite expressing a
"personal preference" for a reference to the UCP printed out in the SWIFT
format, it confirmed that the ICC had already ratified the exclusion of such a
101. Id ch 4 at 4-1 (Scope).
102. See 1983 UCP art 1.
103. See Meeting of May 28, 1986, ICC Docs 470/479, 470/481 (1986); Opinion RI01 at 21, ICC
Docs 470/479 (1984-1986).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See ICC Docs 470/538, 470/561 (1988).
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statement.10 8 In addition, the Commission believed that the problem raised
by the Israeli Committee "was not a UCP question as such, but rather a
SWIFT software problem."' 1 9  The Commission referred the Israeli
Committee to a report submitted by the representative of the British Bankers
Association, which called attention to the fact that "if a documentary credit
message was then used outside the SWIFT environment, SWIFT would have
no control over its use and a specific reference to the UCP would have to be
included in the onward transmission."'"10
The issue of the express incorporation of the UCP in SWIFT messages is
of more than ritualistic interest. Contrary to SWIFT's apparent
perception, I' the decision to exclude the "extra words" concerns more than
economy of space.
2. SWIFT v. UCP. Medium or Message?
a. Negotiation and the enabling clause. The SWIFT message that appears
printed in the hard copy produced by the receiving bank's computer
transcribes SWIFT directives to the advising or confirming banks. One of
these directives is found in SWIFT's data field 41 (a) option (d), which states,
"If the credit is to be freely negotiable by any bank, option D must be used
with the phrase "Any bank in . . . (city or country)," and, "[i]f the credit is to
be freely negotiable by any bank anywhere in the world, an indication of
country is not required." ' "l 2 The language in this directive falls considerably
short of that in the so-called "enabling" clause still inserted in many of the
paper-based, freely negotiable credits: "We hereby engage with the drawers,
endorsers and bona fide holders of drafts drawn under and in compliance
with the terms of the credit that such drafts will be duly honored upon
presentation."' 13
More than a ritualistic phrase, this enabling clause empowers negotiation
of drafts drawn under "freely negotiable credits." Without it or some
equivalent authorization, letters of credit are restricted in their negotiation
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. See Opinion R151 at 13, 14, ICC Doc 469 (1987-1988), which quotes TerryJ. Mitchell of the
British Bankers Association Representative to the ICC Banking Commission as stating that
[alithough he would personally have preferred that SWIFT foresee a clause specifically
stipulating that the credit was subject to the UCP rather than leaving a default situation,
nevertheless the SWIFT view is that the current situation has already been agreed by the
ICC and so unless otherwise stipulated the credit will be subject to the UCP. Of course,
problems could arise when the credit falls outside of SWIFT system and the banks have to
annotate a credit to be in accordance with UCP.
112. See SWIFT User Handbook ch 24 at 24-6, field 41a, Message Type 720/721, Release 90/2
(May 1991).
113. See, for example, the format of an irrevocable negotiation credit in Boris Kozolchyk,
Commercial Letters of Credit in the Americas app 2 at 694 (Matthew Bender, 1966). Unfortunately, the
letter-of-credit forms included in ICC Pub No 416 do not include the customary enabling clause
language transcribed in the principal text, thereby adding to the uncertainty of the power to
negotiate.
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and must be treated as "straight" or "specially advised."" 14 Not surprisingly,
then, banks have objected to the absence of an enabling clause in the
transcription of the SWIFT message used as an operative credit instrument.
In one such instance, an advisory opinion was requested from the ICC
Banking Commission' 15 by Dresdner Bank A. G. Hamburg ("Dresdner
Bank"), which complained about credits issued by "Commonwealth
countries" that transcribed the SWIFT message and failed to include the
enabling clause. In these credits, the type of the commercial letter of credit
was to be inferred from the instructions given in field 41 (a)-(d), as quoted
above, and from the authorization given to the receiving bank to reimburse
itself by debiting the account of the issuing bank in its books. According to
this bank:'' 6
Now it happens, once and again that the beneficiary of such a documentary credit
message insists on having it handed over to him. Often, an amendment or an
extension will follow at a later date, which is no doubt to be handed over as well. It is
now up to the beneficiary to present this operative credit instrument together with
subsequent messages concerning amendments or extensions, if any, and with the
documents against which it is available to any bank of his choice for negotiation.
Although not fully spelled out by Dresdner Bank, the danger of the
objected practice is the uncertainty it creates with respect to negotiation.
Does the purported operative credit instrument truly enable any bona fide
holder of the draft to demand honor of the credit despite the absence of the
traditional or equivalent enabling clause? And assuming that the answer is
affirmative, what then constitutes the operative credit instrument as far as the
bona fide holder is concerned? Is it the original SWIFT unamended text as
presented by the beneficiary to the negotiating bank, or is it the text modified
by all the amendments accepted by the beneficiary either expressly or
114. Kozolchyk, 9 Intl Encyclopedia Comparative L at 34, 35 (cited in note 5). Article 1 lb of the
UCP states, in relevant part:
(b) All credits must nominate the bank (nominated bank) which is authorized to pay (paying
bank), or to accept drafts (accepting bank), or to negotiate (negotiating bank), unless the
credit allows negotiation by any bank (negotiating bank).
(d) By nominating a bank other than itself, or by allowing for negotiation by any bank, or by
authorizing or requesting a bank to add its confirmation, the issuing bank authorizes such
bank to pay, accept or negotiate, as the case may be, against documents which appear on
their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit, and undertakes to
reimburse such bank in accordance with the provisions of these articles.
It could be argued that SWIFT's directive language "any bank in" is as effective an enabling clause as
the traditional one. Yet, different meanings are ascribed to "negotiation," not only in different
countries but also by banks and banking lawyers. Many banks believe that to "negotiate" a credit
means to take up documents for examination and possible future payment whereas lawyers
understand by negotiation to give value for a negotiable instrument, such as a draft. In light of the
ambiguity surrounding negotiation, and the absence of a reference to drafts or other negotiable
instruments in the SWIFT directive, it does not, in this writer's opinion, qualify as a fully fledged
negotiation enabling clause.
115. See Meeting of April 23, 1985, ICC Docs 470/444, 470/450, 470/452 (1985); Opinion R100
at 19, 20, ICC Doc 434 (1984-86) ("R100").
116. R100 at 19 & 20 (cited in note 115).
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tacitly?1 17 While the latter uncertainty also arises with respect to amendments
of nonSWIFT transcriptions, the uncertainty in the use of the SWIFT
transcription is more serious. Consider, for example, the effect of
amendments that arrive after the receiving bank gives or sends out its
transcription of the SWIFT message to the beneficiary but before the time it
would have taken it to prepare its own nonSWIFT software version of the
credit.
Dresdner Bank argued that the SWIFT message is not suited to act as an
operative credit instrument because it was only conceived of as a bank-to-bank
message and did not even bear a signature.'1" It maintained that to use such a
message in communications with the beneficiary creates flaws in the security
of the transaction, especially for the negotiating bank. Finally, Dresdner Bank
pointed out that it is doubtful whether the SWIFT transcription binds the
sending bank to the beneficiary-or put differently, whether the transcription
is the operative credit instrument.' 19 Regrettably, the Banking Commission
sidestepped the issues of the transcription's insufficient authorization for
negotiation and its inability to serve as the operative credit instrument. 20
These issues highlight the inability of SWIFT's message to serve as the
operative credit instrument as far as the beneficiary is concerned.
b. Conflicting procedures and definitions. SWIFT procedures are
significantly at odds with procedures set forth for the very same transactions
by the UCP. Consider, for example, the negotiation procedures in both
sources. The SWIFT User Handbook requires that "the advice to the
beneficiary must be presented at each negotiation," and "[t]he negotiation
bank must note each negotiation on that advice."'' l In contrast, the UCP
requires neither the presentation of the advice at each negotiation nor a
notation for each negotiation. 122  This conflict raises a number of
117. The beneficiary's tacit acceptance of an amendment by tendering documents in compliance
with that amendment is recognized by a widespread banking practice established by this writer in the
process of establishing the customs of banks in the United States in connection with the revision of
the UCP. Often, however, banks require the beneficiary's express consent when the amendment
accepted by the tendered document may affect other terms of the credit, for example, a reduction of
the amounts and change in the shipment dates.
118. As a rule, the receiving bank that sends out a literal transcription of the SWIFT message
states in the letter accompanying the transcription that the attached message was received via
SWIFT. See R100 at 19 & 20 (cited in note 115).
119. Idat20.
120. In id, the ICC Banking Commission merely dismissed the security concerns, as also present
with telex and cable messages and restated the principle of generic and silent incorporation of the
UCP in the SWIFT transcription. In a phone interview on August 1, 1991, Charles del Busto,
Chairman of the Banking Commission, indicated that certain beneficiaries complained about the
practice of sending the SWIFT printout as the operative credit instrument despite the fact that it was
not a communication by the issuer to them. This procedure left unclear the duties of the advising
bank in releasing this instrument. Some of these beneficiaries requested transmittals in the form of
direct communication via safety paper. These complaints were heard when Message Type 700 was
used for the first time.
121. SWIFT User Handbook ch 4 at 4.1, 1 & 2, Message Type 700/701.
122. See 1983 UCP article l0b.4 which states: "If the credit provides for negotiation-to
negotiate without recourse to drawers and/or bona fide holders, draft(s) drawn by the beneficiary, at
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troublesome everyday practice questions, such as: (1) Can a confirming-
negotiating bank that negotiates a credit subject to the UCP reject a tender of
documents that does not contain a hard copy of the credit advice even if such
a requirement is not listed among the terms and conditions of the operative
credit instrument? (2) Can a bank that has issued a credit subject to the UCP
and silent on the need to present the operative credit instrument refuse to
reimburse a confirming bank that did not require such an instrument and/or
failed to notate the negotiation? (3) Is an issuing bank bound to honor such a
presentation if the beneficiary bypasses the confirming bank and presents the
documents directly to it?
If either the confirming-negotiating bank or the issuing bank can reject the
beneficiary's tender of documents based on the SWIFT User Handbook, then
these rules have trespassed upon UCP territory. Unpaid beneficiaries would
be justified in claiming detrimental reliance on the terms of the credit, the
UCP, or UCP-inspired practices. Similarly, legitimate complaints would be
heard with respect to SWIFT's definition of the operative credit instrument.
In accordance with the SWIFT User Handbook, "[u]nless otherwise specified,
a Documentary credit advised to the Beneficiary or another Advising Bank
based on a SWIFT message constitutes an operative credit instrument." 23 In
contrast, the UCP require that if the teletransmission is to be the operative
credit instrument, 24 then such words as "full details to follow" not be
inserted. 25 Since the SWIFT User Handbook does not state that the words
"full details to follow" disqualify the SWIFT message as an operative credit
instrument, a bank may be led to assume that a message containing these
words is the operative credit instrument unless the message contains specific
language stating otherwise.126
sight or at a tenor, on the issuing bank or on the applicant for the credit or on any other drawee
stipulated in the credit other than the confirming bank itself."
123. SWIFT User Handbook ch 4 at 4-1, Message Type 700/701.
124. UCP art 12 (c).
125. Id arts 12 (a) and (b) state, in relevant part:
(a) When an issuing bank instructs a bank (advising bank) by any teletransmission to advise
a credit or an amendment to a credit, and intends the mail confirmation to be the operative
credit instrument, or the operative amendment, the teletransmission must state "full details
to follow" (or words of similar effect) or that the mail confirmation will be the operative
credit instrument or the operative amendment ....
(b) The teletransmission will be deemed the operative credit instrument or the operative
amendment, and no mail confirmation should be sent, unless the teletransmission states
"full details to follow" (or words of similar effect), or states that the mail confirmation is the
operative credit instrument or the operative amendment.
126. The following are additional instances of conflicting procedures and definitions. SWIFT's
guidelines and instructions pertaining to confirmations may preclude reimbursement by an advising
bank that decides to "silently" confirm the issuing bank's irrevocable credit. A silent confirmation
occurs when an advising or negotiating bank of a freely negotiable credit promises to purchase or
negotiate beneficiary's draft drawn against the issuing bank. It also takes place when an advising or
negotiating bank states in a communication to the beneficiary that it is willing to confirm an
irrevocable letter of credit silent as to its confirmation. In the first case, the silent confirmation is
nothing more than an agreement to purchase or negotiate a draft which can be entered into without
letter-of-credit authorization. In the second case, the advising or confirming bank assumes the
primary liability of an issuer and confirmer, and this liability cannot be assumed without the letter of
credit's authorization. The second type of silent confirmation has become controversial precisely
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c. The contextual meanings of "operative credit instrument, " "writing, " and
"signature." Similar instances of collisions or near collisions between SWIFT
rules and the UCP are likely to arise and multiply unless each set of rules is
placed in its proper context. SWIFT's context is that of interbank
communications; its messages are designed for utilization solely by member
banks. Member banks are entitled to expect from SWIFT speedy and secure
communications, and, in exchange, they are bound to observe specified duties
of diligence and good faith. In this interbank context, a SWIFT
teletransmission of a Message Type 700 or 701 is, as suggested earlier, the
operative credit instrument. In the same context, a receiving bank need
hardly be reminded of the tacit incorporation of the UCP in the sender's
telecommunication or of the operational meaning of "full details to follow."
Moreover, while no member bank should expect a Message Type 700 to be
signed, it should expect it to be authenticated. This expectation reflects the
banks' willingness to abide by some SWIFT-inspired usages as binding
custom. Accordingly, even if the UCP had not so declared, SWIFT users
would treat the telecommunication of the documentary credit as a binding
writing and the authentication of the message as the functional equivalent of a
signature. The same is not true, however, in the receiving bank-beneficiary
context.
Article 12 of the UCP gives binding effect to the interbank electronic letter
of credit but fails to clarify that a SWIFT message is not the operative credit
because it is undertaken by banks that have not been requested to confirm the credit by the issuing
bank. The UCP contain no prohibition against these silent confirmations and thus could be
interpreted as allowing a silent confirmer's claim of reimbursement from the issuing bank. SWIFT's
field 49 (Handbook ch 4 at 4-7), however, limits the confirmation instructions to the advising bank to
the following: "confirm" (by which the confirmer is requested to confirm the credit), "may add" (by
which the receiver may add its confirmation), and "without" (by which the receiver is not requested
to confirm the credit). If SWIFT guidelines were to be given binding force, they could be interpreted
as allowing reimbursement for confirmations only when the receiver was instructed to confirm or was
allowed to add its confirmation.
Conversely, SWIFT field 41 (a) lists a form of payment referred to as "mixed payment," which is
not included in UCP article 11 (a) among those available to the beneficiary of a documentary credit.
(Article 1 la of 1983 UCP states: "All credits must indicate whether they are available by sight
payment, by deferred payment, by acceptance or negotiation.") If by "mixed payment," SWIFT
means a credit payable partly at sight or by acceptance or negotiation, and partly by a deferred
payment, a bank paying a letter of credit incorporating the UCP that does not specify such a form
payment would be justified in rejecting it. Mutatis mutandis, SWIFT's directive requiring "the
cancellation of a Documentary credit take the form of an amendment" (Swift Handbook ch 11 at 11-
1), could also be easily at odds with a letter-of-credit stipulation. Assume, for example, that a bank
issued a financial standby credit subject to revocation or cancellation upon the issuer's determination
that the payment fund was depleted, or upon the applicant's or third party's certification of
depletion. Following the SWIFT User Handbook, the bank, upon its determination of depletion or
upon the applicant's or third-party certification, would have to handle the revocation or cancellation
as an amendment. Yet, as an amendment, the revocation or cancellation would have to be accepted
by the beneficiary before it became effective. See UCP art 10d. Predictably, the beneficiary may
decide to reject the amendment, thereby preventing the revocation or cancellation of the credit. If
this rejection is upheld, the issuing bank may become liable to the applicant for failure to follow his
instructions and the letter-of-credit stipulations. The same problem occurs with annually renewable
standby credits. Often the beneficiaries of these credits request an annual amendment of the credit
to signify its validity for the upcoming annual period. By requesting this amendment, however, the
beneficiary risks transforming a multi-year credit into a year-to-year commitment.
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instrument or amendment as far as the nonSWIFT-environment beneficiary is
concerned. Neither does article 12 state whether an unsigned, paper-based
transcription of the original SWIFT message is binding on the issuing bank.
The banking practice is that a beneficiary can rely on a SWIFT message only
once it becomes a "writing" in the traditional sense of the term-that is, once
it has been reduced to a signed or otherwise authenticated paper-based
document.' 2 7 In most cases, the receiving bank prints out the SWIFT
message and adds whatever clause its software is programmed to print. Thus,
in banking practice, a printout or hard copy of the SWIFT message can be the
operative credit instrument for the non SWIFT-environment beneficiary.
This dualism, requiring different "instruments," legal prerequisites, and
sources of law, must be acknowledged and boundaries must be set.
The basic principle for setting the boundaries of paperless-credit law is
that the environment, and not the presence of a beneficiary, determines which
source of law is applied. Consider, for example, the case of a SWIFT
receiving bank that is also the beneficiary of the letter of credit. If the
demarcation rule were that the teletransmission ceased to be the operative
instrument once the electronic message reached the beneficiary, the receiving
127. For a description of banking practices on the writings sent to intermediary banks and to the
beneficiaries, and for an analysis of the conflict between UCP and UCC rules, see Kozolchyk, 8
George Mason U L Rev at 292-97 (cited in note 52). For definitions of a writing in the context of
commercial and banking transactions, see UNCITRAL 1990 at 6, 7 (cited in note 10):
[a writing is defined] . . . normally by reference to the mode of imposition on the medium
rather than by reference to the nature of the medium itself. For example, under the
Interpretation Act 1978 in the United Kingdom, (Interpretation Act 1978, Schedule 1)) the
term writing includes typing, printing, lithography, photography and other modes of
representing or reproducing words in a visible form, whilst section 1-201(46) of UCC
provides that "written" or "writing" includes printing, typewriting or any other reduction to
tangible form. It is probably the case that whenever a statute uses the word "writing"
without a definition, the legislator originally expected the writing to be on a traditional
piece of paper or some other physical medium emitting the words to be read directly by
humans.
The definition of a writing has often been extended to include a telegram or telex, as in
article 13 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods. In article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, the definition of a writing has been further extended to include "telex,
telegrams, or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement."
Article 4(3) of the draft Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in
International Trade proves that "the document . . . may be issued in any form which
preserves a record of the information contained therein." A similar idea is expressed in the
definition of "notice in writing" in article 1(4) (b) of the 1988 UNIDROIT Convention on
International Factoring, in which a writing "includes, but is not limited to, telegram, telex
and any other telecommunication capable of being reproduced in tangible form."
On the other hand, as pointed out by James E. Byrne, Electronic Trade Payment-U.S. Legal
Perspective 47 (1987) (SWIFT/SIBOS conference paper), "there is nothing in either the term 'paper'
or 'document' inherently containing the concept of an original or barring the description of a
printout from electronic impulses as either a paper or a document." The same author points out that
"[a]s to signature, authenticated or tested transmissions can be a symbol executed or adopted with
present intention to authenticate a writing within the scope of (UCC) Section 1-201(39)." Id at 51.
He adds that UCC § 5-104(2) expressly provides by way of example that "a telegram may be a
sufficiently signed writing if it identifies its sender by an authorized authentication. The
authentication may be in code and the authorized naming of the issuer in an advice of credit is a
sufficient signing." Id at 52.
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bank in our example could not rely on the teletransmission and could only
rely on a paper-based instrument. Such a rule would be at odds with banking
practice. 128 Thus the demarcation point should be determined not by the
mere presence of a beneficiary, but by the recipients or beneficiary's
environment. In a nonSWIFT environment, the operative instrument may be
the signed or authenticated writing of section 5-104 of the UCC, or if the
message were conveyed by a proprietary or value-added network, whatever its
"master agreement" or system rules identified as the operative instrument.
d. The need for the reassertion of the primacy of the UCP. As far as the parties
to the letter of credit are concerned, the UCP as transactional rules displace
SWIFT as system rules. It could not be otherwise unless these parties
considered the medium more important than their message. Primacy of the
UCP over the SWIFT User Handbook does not mean that SWIFT cannot
promulgate its own rules of diligence or that it cannot apportion or limit its
liability for acts or events that take place in its environment. Rather, primacy
of the UCP means that no SWIFT rule or procedure can grant rights or
impose duties inconsistent with the UCP's. It also means that in the event of
conflict, the UCP prevails.
II
ELECTRONIC REIMBURSEMENTS OF LETTERS OF CREDIT AND ARTICLE
4A OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. The Scope of Article 4A and Letter-of-Credit Reimbursement Practices
The electronic reimbursement of a letter-of-credit payment effected in the
United States is subject not only to the UCP and SWIFT User Handbook, but
also to articles 5 and 4a of the UCC and to the United States Council on
International Banking ("USCIB") Guidelines and Procedures for Bank-to-
Bank Reimbursements.129 Since article 5 covers the entire spectrum of letter-
of-credit transactions (at least as that spectrum was envisaged when article 5
was enacted), its application to any phase of the credit transaction should be
expected. This is not true with respect to article 4A, which is devoted to
electronic fund transfers and purports to exclude letters of credit from its
application. Indeed, Official Comment 3 to section 4A-104 calls attention to
the limited scope of section 4A-103(a)(1)(i)-(iii). This limitation is based
upon the unconditionality of the payment order that transfers funds
electronically-that is, if the payment order is conditional, it is excluded from
article 4A. In furtherance of this principle, the Official Comment provides
examples of transactions intended to be both excluded and included:
[A] New York bank may have issued a letter of credit in favor of X, a California seller
of goods to be shipped to the New York bank's customer in New York. The terms of
128. Phone interview with Dan Taylor (July 3, 1991), in which he indicated that receiving-
beneficiary banks commonly rely on their computer records of the sender-issuer's letter of credit.
129. See note 135. The Guidelines apply to all USCIB member banks automatically; they apply
only to those correspondent banks that agree to be bound by the rules.
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the letter of credit provide for payment to X if documents are presented to prove
shipment of the goods. Instead of providing for presentment of documents to the
New York bank, the letter of credit states that they may be presented to a California
bank that acts as an agent for payment. The New York bank sends an instruction to
the California bank to pay X upon presentation of the required documents. The
instruction is not covered by 4A because payment to the beneficiary is conditional
upon receipt of shipping documents .... Although the payment by the New York bank to X
under the letter of credit is not covered by article 4A, if X is paid by the California bank, payment of
the obligation of the New York bank to reimburse the California bank could be made by an article
4A funds transfer .... For example, if the New York bank pays its reimbursement obligation to the
California bank by a Fedwire naming the California bank as beneficiary, payment is made to the
California bank rather than to X. That payment is governed by article 4A and it could be made
either before or after payment by the California bank to X. 13 0
Unfortunately, the separation between the fund transfer covered by article
4A and the instruction to negotiate or pay a letter of credit covered by article
5 is not as clear-cut as is assumed by the above Official Comment. First of all,
one must question the unconditionality of the payment order addressed to the
"agents for payment" referred to in Official Comment 3 to section 4A-104.
Several "agents for payment" exist in letter-of-credit law and practice, and
many, if not most, of their payments are conditional. Depending upon the
terms of the transaction, advising, confirming, negotiating, reimbursing, and
paying banks can all be considered the issuing bank's agents for payment.
Assume, for example, that the California Bank in Official Comment 3's
example is an advising bank that was asked by the issuing bank to take up the
beneficiary's documents and pay if they comply with the terms and conditions
of the credit. As the Official Comment acknowledges, the advising bank's
payment to the beneficiary is conditional and therefore beyond the scope of
article 4A. Yet, despite the New York bank's use of FEDWIRE or CHIPS for
purposes of reimbursing the California advising-paying bank, the New York
bank's "direct" method of reimbursement 13 still presupposes that the
documents against which the California bank paid complied with the terms
and conditions of the credit. If the documents did not comply, the issuing
bank, after payment, would either debit the advising-paying bank's account (if
130. See UCC § 4A-104(3) comment 3 (emphasis added). Comment 4 to the same provisions
elaborates on the distinction between "credit" transfers and "debit" transfers as follows:
In a credit transfer the instruction to pay is given by the person making payment. In a debit
transfer the instruction to pay is given by the person receiving payment. The purpose of
subparagraph (ii) of subsecton (a)(l) of Section 4A-103 is to include credit transfers in 4A
and to exclude debit transfers.
131. In this direct method of reimbursement, the issuing bank's promise of reimbursement is
usually stated in the communication accompanying the operative credit instrument or in the
operative credit instrument itself. It may also appear as an authorization to debit the account of
issuing bank with the reimbursing bank in either of the above communications. This method of
reimbursement is known as a "book transfer" because no physical (including electronic) movement
of funds among banks is required. Dan Taylor describes the most typical form of direct
reimbursement as follows: "Bank A issues its credit and advises it to Bank B who is authorized to pay
the credit. Reimbursement instructions for the paying bank are provided in the credit itself. Bank B
advises the credit to beneficiary C. When Beneficiary C presents documents to Bank B, Bank B pays
the credit and claims reimbursement from Bank A." See Memorandum from Dan Taylor to Boris
Kozolchyk (July 4, 1991) (on file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona College
of Law) ("Taylor Memorandum").
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such an account exists) or seek the return of its payment.' 3 2 The New York
issuing bank's reimbursement via CHIPS or FEDWIRE, therefore, remains a
conditional form of payment, although the condition is not precedent, but
subsequent. Indeed, advising-paying banks use typical "condition
subsequent" language in describing their right to reimbursement:
reimbursement can be claimed "as long as the documents against which we
paid are in compliance."'13 3
The "bank-to-bank" reimbursing bank is another "agent for payment"
whose payment is also conditional. Unlike the method of reimbursement
described in Official Comment 3 to section 4A-104, bank-to-bank
reimbursement does not involve a direct payment by the issuing bank to the
advising-paying bank. As an indirect method of reimbursement, it rather
relies on an intermediary correspondent bank acting as the issuing bank's
agent for payment or reimbursement of the advising bank.
B. Article 4A and the USCIB Guidelines
The bank-to-bank agent for payment is so ubiquitous in letter-of-credit
practice that the USCIB 134 found it necessary in 1981 to enact a set of
procedures on bank-to-bank reimbursements, subsequently revised as
Guidelines and Procedures. 3 5 The banks involved in this reimbursement
transaction are the issuing, reimbursing, and claiming banks. An issuing bank
is a bank that "issued a Reimbursement Authorization under its letter of
credit."' 3 6 A reimbursing bank is a bank authorized to effect reimbursement
"pursuant to a Reimbursement Authorization issued by the issuing bank."' 3 7 And a
claiming bank is a bank that negotiated, paid, or accepted drafts under a letter
of credit and claims reimbursement from the reimbursing bank "under the
Reimbursement Authorization issued by the issuing bank." i38
132. Id.
133. Telephone Interview with Dan Taylor (July 5, 1991).
134. On the USCIB, see note 9.
135. See the United States Practices and Procedures Governing Bank-to-Bank Reimbursements
Under Letters of Credit (1981), revised in 1990 as United States Guidelines and Procedures
Governing Bank-to-Bank Reimbursement under Letters of Credit (Feb 22,1990) ("Guidelines") (on
file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona College of Law). Dan Taylor
describes the bank-to-bank reimbursement as follows:
Bank X issues its credit and authorizes Bank Y to advise the credit to the beneficiary and pay
the credit if properly drawn on. At the time of issuance of the credit, Bank X provides
another bank, Bank Z, with a reimbursement authorization telling them that Bank Y has
been instructed to claim reimbursement on Bank Z and if they claim the reimbursement,
Bank Z is to debit Bank X's account and pay Bank Y.
Taylor Memorandum (cited in note 131).
136. Guidelines art la (cited in note 135).
137. Id art lb (emphasis added).
138. Id art Ic (emphasis added). Dan Taylor characterizes the claiming bank's request for
payment from the reimbursement bank as a debit transfer in accordance with the definition of debit
transfer in 4A-104 comment (4): "In a debit transfer the instruction to pay is given by the person
receiving the payment." Taylor points out that this definition should exclude bank-to-bank letter-of-
credit reimbursements from the application of article 4A. Taylor Memorandum (cited in note 131).
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The USCIB Guidelines provide for two types of reimbursement
authorization. The first is issued by the issuing bank to the reimbursing bank
and reimburses a claiming bank for its negotiation or payment under the
letter of credit or its acceptance of a time draft drawn on the reimbursing
bank.' 39 The second is described as a "separate, irrevocable undertaking of
the reimbursing bank, issued at the request of the issuing bank, to a bank
nominated in the Reimbursement Authorization to honor their claim(s) (sic)
under such undertaking, provided that the terms of said undertaking have been
complied with." 140
The italicized language makes clear that this reimbursement is predicated
upon compliance with pre-established terms and conditions. In addition,
article 9(a) of the USCIB Guidelines sets forth a major documentary condition
precedent to the payment of sight claims: the claiming bank's claim for
reimbursement "must be in the form of an original letter or
teletransmission."' 4 1 Article 9(a) also forbids the use of such other
documents as "the claiming bank's advice of payment, acceptance,
negotiation or deferred payment to the Issuing Bank."' 42 Such a condition
precedent presupposes that prior to reimbursing the claiming bank, the
reimbursing-paying bank examines the claim document or message and
determines its appropriateness.
C. Consequences of Applying Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A to
Letter-of-Credit Reimbursements
The application of article 4A to the reimbursement of a payment or
negotiation of a letter of credit creates serious problems. To begin with,
article 4A requires acts of diligence from the receiving bank that, while
appropriate for electronic fund transfers, are inappropriate for the
reimbursement of letter-of-credit payments. Consider, for example, article
4A's security procedures. Section 4A-201 defines a security procedure as one
established by agreement between a customer (including a correspondent
bank) 143 and the receiving bank "for the purpose of (i) verifying that a
payment order or communication amending or cancelling a payment order is
that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission or the content
of the payment order or communication."'' 44 Section 4A-201 goes on to
enumerate security procedures discussed earlier in connection with
SWIFT, 14 5 such as algorithms, encryption, and identifying words or numbers.
The section concludes by asserting that "[c]omparison of a signature on a
139. Guidelines art Id.
140. Id art le (emphasis added).
141. Idart9a.
142. Id.
143. See UCC § 4A-105(a)(3). Dan Taylor points out that there is often no relationship between
the reimbursing bank and the claiming bank that would establish a customer relationship in a bank-
to-bank reimbursement transaction. Taylor Memorandum at 6 (cited in note 131).
144. UCC § 4A-201.
145. See text accompanying notes 32-39.
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payment order or communication with an authorized specimen signature of
the customer is not by itself a security procedure."'' 46  These requirements
and procedures are inconsistent with letter-of-credit reimbursement practice.
As stated by Dan Taylor, the USCIB's executive director, in a recent
memorandum:
While many bank-to-bank reimbursement (authorizations) are communicated
electronically, a large amount is communicated by mail. 14 7 Section 4A-201 states that
a comparison of a signature on a payment order or communication with an authorized
specimen signature of the customer is not by itself a security procedure. Yet, with a
mail bank-to-bank reimbursement this comparison is the only verification or
authentication that exists .... The bank-to-bank reimbursement is, in fact, not a
payment order but only an instruction to reimburse a claiming bank if the claim is
received and, then, according to any conditions of authorization. 14 8
A reimbursing bank, acting as an article 4A receiving bank, must take into
account that failure to carry out the section 4A-201 security procedures will
determine who, as between the receiving bank and the sender or purported
sender, will bear the loss resulting from a spurious or erroneous payment
order. 149 Moreover, section 4A-202 protects the receiving bank against a
customer's allegation of an ineffective payment order only if the following
requirements are met: (1) the receiving bank and its customer agree that the
authenticity of the payment order will be verified by a security procedure; (2)
the security procedure is "commercially reasonable"; and (3) "the [receiving]
bank proves that it accepted the payment order in good faith and in
compliance with the security procedure and any written agreement or
instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of payment orders issued in
the name of the customer."' 150 The net result of sections 4A-201 and 4A-202
is that a reimbursing bank whose verification procedures do not qualify as
commercially reasonable is unprotected against a customer's allegation of
ineffective reimbursement authorization.
By the same reasoning, a letter-of-credit paying bank that does not follow
sections 4A-201's and 4A-202's security procedures when wiring funds to a
designated numbered account may find itself responsible for the
consequences of an unauthorized or fraudulent transfer. Consider, for
example, the case in which paying Bank A receives a letter on the beneficiary's
stationery, signed by the purported beneficiary and asking that payment be
wired to a numbered account at Bank B. The funds are wired by Bank A to
Bank B, where they are credited to the designated numbered account, which
146. UCC § 4A-201.
147. One large money center bank estimates that presently it receives approximately 83,000
reimbursement authorizations per year, of which 4,500 are mail authorizations. It also handled
17,000 amendments to these authorizations and 96,000 claims for reimbursement (including partial
shipments and amended authorizations), and of these 6,000 were by mail. Telephone interview with
Dan Taylor (July 2, 1991). If one divides the number of mail authorizations by the number of annual
working days (250), this bank receives an average of 20 mail authorizations and 25 mail claims per
day.
148. Taylor Memorandum at 6 & 7 (cited in note 131).
149. See Official Comment to UCC § 4A-201.
150. UCC § 4A-202(b).
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turns out to belong to the same fraudulent schemer who had appropriated the
beneficiary's stationery and forged his authorization. While it may be argued
that such a wire transfer is not an article 4A payment order because it is a
"debit" and not a "credit" transfer, the burden of proof on this issue would
fall on the paying bank.15 ' If unsuccessful in its proof, the paying bank would
be saddled with a risk it is not prepared to undertake as a mere paymaster of
letters of credit. It should be remembered that unlike the bank customer-
originator of an electronic payment fund, who is usually well known to the
bank issuing the payment order, the beneficiary of a letter of credit may not be
well known to the paying bank.
Other consequences of applying article 4A to bank-to-bank
reimbursements can be equally serious. Section 4A-301, for example, states
that the execution date of a payment order may be determined by instruction
of the sender but "cannot be earlier than the date received, and unless
otherwise determined, is the day the order is received." A bank-to-bank
reimbursement authorization, however, seldom if ever states a fixed date for
payment because the reimbursing bank will not know until the complying
tender is paid by the claiming bank whether a claim for reimbursement will be
made.' 52 In fact, the USCIB Guidelines discourage the statement of an
expiration date in a Reimbursement Authorization.15 3 In contrast with article
4A's restrictive "payment date of the order,"' 54 the Guidelines provide the
reimbursing bank with "a reasonable time to honor claims made to them by
the Claiming Bank."' 55  Similarly, section 4A-302(d)'s prohibition of
deduction of charges for services and expenses is at odds with standard letter-
of-credit practice. 156
One of the most serious consequences of applying article 4A to electronic
letter-of-credit reimbursements or prepayments is the possibility of involving
an innocent confirming bank in the issuing bank's violation of the law.' 57
151. UCC § 4A-207 (b) relieves the beneficiary's bank from liability when the payment order it
received identified the beneficiary both by name and by an identifying or bank account number and
the name and number identify different persons. As stated by subsection (1):
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), if the beneficiary's bank does not know that
the name and number refer to different persons, it may rely on the number as the proper
identification of the beneficiary of the order. The beneficiary's bank need not determine
whether the name and number refer to the same person.
152. Taylor Memorandum at 8 (cited in note 131)
153. Article 4 of the Guidelines states in relevant part: "Therefore, while the loc must have an
expiry date, the Authorization should not have an 'expiry date' except as indicated in article 5 herein.
Reimbursing banks will assume no responsibility for expiry dates of Authorizations unless and to the
extent expressly agreed to by them ......
154. The "payment date of the order" is the due date for the beneficiary's bank in section 4A-
404(a).
155. Guidelines art 6a (cited in note 135).
156. The Taylor Memorandum describes the letter-of-credit practice as follows: "If a credit
states that all charges are for the account of the beneficiary and the reimbursement authorization is
silent, the reimbursement charges will be deducted from the claim paid to the claiming bank. The
claiming bank will often deduct its own charges from the proceeds paid to the beneficiary." Taylor
Memorandum (cited in note 131).
157. Some of the following hypotheticals were part of a memorandum submitted by Professor
James Byrne of George Mason University School of Law and this writer to Professors Robert L.
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Assume that Bank A has issued an electronic letter of credit in violation of the
antiboycott-of-Israel regulations and has requested Bank B to confirm it as
SWIFT. Simultaneously, Bank A has wired funds on behalf of its customer to
Bank B's account via CHIPS, and the funds arrive first. Pursuant to sections
4A-209(b)(2) and 4A-403(a)(1)-(2), Bank B (known in article 4A as the
"beneficiary's bank")15 8 has accepted the payment order, inter alia, when it has
received the entire amount of Bank A's payment order.' 59 Accordingly, Bank
B is obligated to pay the beneficiary under section 4A-404(a).' 60 While it is
clear that the payment may be stopped or enjoined as illegal,' 6 ' it is not clear
whether the receiving bank incurs liability to the beneficiary if the payment is
so stopped or enjoined. It is also unclear whether the confirming bank incurs
liability under the antiboycott regulations for having "accepted" an order to
pay an illegal letter of credit.
The preceding hypothetical problem highlights the danger of importing
article 4A's notion of "acceptance" of the payment order into an article 5
letter-of-credit prepayment or reimbursement context. There is no
equivalent in letter-of-credit law or practice to article 4A's "beneficiary's
bank's" automatic duty of payment upon receipt of the payment order. Thus,
whenever an issuing bank electronically transfers to a confirming bank the
funds to pay a letter-of-credit beneficiary and this transfer is unaccompanied
by what Official Comment 3 to section 4A-104 refers to as an instruction "to
pay upon presentation of the required documents," both banks are at risk of
having to honor the credit prematurely and wrongfully. If the funds arrive
before the message requesting confirmation of the letter of credit, under
section 4A-404(a), the (future) confirming bank becomes liable for payment
to the beneficiary on the payment date of the order because it is acting as the
"beneficiary's bank."' 162 The arrival of the funds before the confirmation
request is not an unusual situation in the letter-of-credit situation where a
considerable number of credits are prepaid (not collateralized) prior to either
issuance or confirmation.
In 1989, as the draft of article 4A was being considered for adoption, a
possible solution was suggested to the many problems created by the uneasy
Jordan and William D. Warren, Reporters for article 4A, on July 7, 1989 ("Byrne & Kozolchyk
Memorandum") (on file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona College of
Law). Professor Byrne was acting as Chairman of the ABA Task Force for the Revision of Article 5;
this writer was USCIB Representative to the ICC for the revision of the UCP and member of the ALI
Consultative Commission on Articles 3, 4, and 4A.
158. See UCC § 4A-103(a)(3).
159. Id § 4A-209(b)(2) states: "(b) Subject to subsections (c) and (d), a beneficiary's bank accepts
a payment order at the earliest of the following times: (2) when the bank receives payment of the
entire amount of the sender's order pursuant to section 4A-403(a)(l) or 4A-403 (a)2); or ....-
160. Id § 4A-404(a) states in relevant part: "Subject to Sections 4A-211 (e), 4A-405(d) and 4A-
405(e), if a beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order, the bank is obliged to pay the amount of the
order to the beneficiary of the order ....-
161. See, among others, Chuidian v Philippine National Bank, 734 F Supp 415 (D Cal 1990).
162. See UCC § 4A-404(a) and contrast with id § 5-112.
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interaction among articles 4A and article 5 of the UCC and the UCP. 163 The
solution was to add the following language to section 4A-104: "To the extent,
however, that the funds transfer is connected with a letter-of-credit
transaction, it is governed by article 5." The increasing uneasiness of the
letter-of-credit community with the above-described problems warrants
reconsideration of the suggested addendum.
D. The Applicant Initiated Electronic Letter of Credit
1. Procedure. The first attempts by individual banks (as distinguished from
banking networks) to issue letters of credit electronically occurred in the early
1970s.'64 The raw data for the issuance of the letter of credit were fed by a
paper tape into a rudimentary word processor. This word processor not only
produced the text of the letter of credit, but also simultaneously credited or
debited the appropriate bank accounts.' 65 The second (and present) stage in
the process of "computerizing" letter-of-credit transactions commenced in
the late 1970s. During this stage, it became possible for an applicant to
prepare an electronic draft of the letter of credit at his place of business and
to transmit it to the issuing bank for ultimate issuance. 66 This stage was
made possible by the development of software that allowed not only the
creation of the letter-of-credit application in accordance with a pre-
programmed format, but also its transmission to the issuing bank's computer.
Since this method was designed for multiple issuances, it required a master
reimbursement agreement between the applicant and the issuing bank. Upon
execution of the master reimbursement agreement, the applicant was
provided with security devices that validated his message and authorized the
release of the letter of credit.
The draft of the electronic letter of credit generated by the applicant has
many of the same features as the SWIFT letter of credit, including discrete
163. Professor Byrne and I proposed this approach to two Reporters for article 4A. See Byrne &
Kozolchyk Memorandum (cited in note 157).
164. Interview with Mr. Gad Janay (Jan 16, 1990) (notes on file with the Documentation Center of
the University of Arizona College of Law). Mr. Janay is President of Complex Systems Inc. of New
York, and is one of the most respected pioneers in the computerization of letter-of-credit
transactions. Charles del Busto, on August 1, 1991, stated that in the early 1960s Leonard Black of
Citibank experimented with quasi-electronic credits by "masking" customers' applications with the
issuing bank's template. This was accomplished by superimposing the name of the bank, the
necessary engagement clauses, and the space for the authorized signature, onto the customer's
application, and then xeroxing the text onto safety paper to generate the original letter-of-credit
instrument. This instrument was sent to the advising bank or the beneficiary via mail and in some
instances by long-distance xerox to selected overseas branches for onward transmission to the
beneficiaries. This process avoided re-keying all the information in the application into the credit
text and reducing potential typographical and transmission errors.
165. Id.
166. The description in the principal text summarizes interviews during 1990 with the following
New York City bankers: Messrs. James Mc Ginley and Don Smith at Citibank, Vincent Maullela at
Manufacturers Hanover, and Joe Nielson and Scott McCoy at Chase Manhattan Bank. The text of
these interviews is on file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona College of
Law. Individual interviews will be cited only when the information was the product of that interview.
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fields tagged in accordance with a standardized format. 167 The draft of the
letter of credit also requires the use of a password and carries with it
encryption devices. The applicant-initiated text is transmitted to the issuing
bank's computer and is accompanied by an electronic signal or code for
message authentication and customer identification. Thus, when an applicant
logs in to the host computer at the issuing bank, a prompt in the system
requests a password. Once the message has been authenticated by the
password, most software programs require that the applicant type in his
identification key or code number. This key is changed periodically and is
subject to stringent security procedures, including the delivery of the key to
the applicant by a special messenger or courier.
At some of the larger money center and regional banks, the applicant's
electronic draft is received by a "host" computer whose function is to
establish the authenticity of the computer-generated message. The host
computer does not check for line-of-credit authorization or for any other
substantive element of the credit. It merely establishes that the letter-of-
credit message contains the required security codes and that it was sent by an
authorized applicant. Once this step is completed, the message is transmitted
to the appropriate department for a substantive check. This check focuses on
credit limits, proper formulation of the terms and conditions of the credit, and
use of intermediary banks, whether as advising, confirming, negotiating,
reimbursing, or paying banks.
In order to perform the substantive pre-issuance checks, the clerk logs the
electronic draft of the letter of credit into his own computer terminal. There
he "maps" all the data fields and creates the proposed text for issuance. As a
rule, the incoming text is "field tagged" when it appears on the clerk's screen
and requires a minimum of typing. Some programs allow the clerk to
determine the insertions made by the applicant in the original format supplied
by the issuing bank. As a rule, the clerk checks the applicant's text against
UCP requirements, and where necessary, suggests changes to the customer.
The accepted changes are noted in the clerk's log, and the letter of credit will
await release until the applicant and the responsible bank official approve the
issuance. Usually such an approval is coded and appears in a given part of the
computer message. Often the applicant waits until he can examine a hard
copy of the amended text before he gives his approval. After applicant
approval, the bank clerk reviews the approved changes before requesting final
approval. This is true even though the applicant and the bank clerk can check
the bank's latest version of the credit by logging into the applicant's computer
"account." In this respect, the current procedures are less automatic than
167. According to Scott McCoy of Chase Manhattan Bank, some of the computer programs used
for these applicant-initiated issuances contain no field limitations on length. Interview with Scott
McCoy (Dec 7, 1990) (notes on file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona
College of Law).
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those that prevailed in 1986, which allowed an immediate release of the credit
upon completion of "fail-safe" procedures. 68
Phone verification of the applicant's approval of the final text provides the
applicant with extra time for accepting his liability with respect to the
"establishment" of the credit. Once the credit is approved by the applicant
and the issuing bank, it is sent to the intermediary banks, usually via SWIFT,
or to the beneficiary by cable, telex, or letter or in fewer instances, by
computer-to-computer communications.
2. The Applicant-Issuing Bank Master Agreement. A review of master
agreements currently in use' 69 reveals a threefold pattern of regulation of the
applicant-issuing bank electronic letter-of-credit relationship. Some of the
terms and conditions in these agreements are designed to protect the issuing
bank's proprietary interest in the software licensed to the applicant. Another
set of provisions encourages and protects what will be referred to as the safe
usage of the software. A final group of provisions organizes the traffic of
messages between the applicant and the issuing bank by specifying, among
other things, the time of establishment of the applicant's instructions.
a. The issuing bank as a licensor of software. Master agreements characterize
the applicant's use of the issuing bank's software as pursuant to a
nontransferable, nonexclusive license or as a sublicense if the software is
provided by a third party. As a licensee or sublicensee, the applicant is
subject to a number of duties designed to protect the exclusivity and safe use
of the software. Exclusivity is protected by: (1) specifying that only the
designated issuing bank can be a recipient of the authorized messages and (2)
limiting the messages to a list that includes applications for the issuance of
letters of credit and instructions and inquiries concerning other letters of
credit and related transactions such as guarantees to steamship companies or
airlines to induce their release of goods. Exclusivity is also protected by
prohibitions against the creation of additional copies of the software (except
for a "back up" or archival copy) and by the duty of confidentiality.
b. The applicant's duty of safe use. The applicant's duty safely to use the
issuing bank's software is found in agreement provisions that require that the
applicant's personnel be trained in the use of the software and that the
applicant give prompt notice of software malfunctions or defects. Some of the
larger banks provide the applicant with user manuals and require compliance
with the manuals' procedures in order to discharge the duty of safe usage.
The observance of proper security procedures, part of the duty of safe usage,
requires the issuing bank to provide the applicant with test codes and/or
cipher booklets and authentication devices. Exclusivity as well as the safe use
of the software are protected by the applicant's duty to locate the software in a
168. See Kozolchyk, 8 George Mason U L Rev at 292 (cited in note 52).
169. Four master agreements were reviewed, two from money center banks and two from
regional banks. These banks wished to protect their privacy and therefore will remain anonymous.
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designated computer or computers and by his assumption of the risk of
malfunction or miscommunication if the software is used outside his principal
place of business. In addition, the applicant assumes responsibility for the
accuracy of the message transmitted to the issuing bank.
Even though only one of the three master agreements examined made it
clear that the above enumeration of the applicant's duties of safe usage was
not exhaustive, experience suggests the wisdom of such a clarification. For
example, the presence of computer "viruses" in the applicant's own software
has become an increasingly difficult problem.' 70 These viruses, usually
imported into the applicant's computer from "bulletin boards" and pirated
software, impede or distort the applicant's teletransmission of data. Thus,
future master agreements are likely to require that the applicant assume
responsibility for a "virus-free" environment.
c. Rules of traffic. The master agreement rules of traffic have undergone
a significant transformation since 1986.17t At that time, some of the largest
money center banks prided themselves on the automation of their issuance
process. Some of these banks encouraged the applicant to regard himself as
the drafter of the letter of credit, subject only to fail-safe checks by the issuing
bank. Current master agreements take a different tack, emphasizing the
issuing bank's discretion in the ultimate issuance of the letter of credit. Some
of these agreements characterize the applicant's communications as either
"applications" or "requests for issuance." The agreements also contain rules
on the finality of such requests and typically state that authenticated requests
are final upon receipt. The request may not be revoked or canceled by the
applicant unless the issuing bank consents. In legal parlance, the applicant's
request for issuance is deemed established and therefore irrevocable as of the
moment of receipt by the issuing bank. The issuing bank, in turn, is not
obligated to act upon the applicant's request, but rather may exercise its
discretion as to the issuance of the letter of credit.
d. Limitation of liability. Master agreements invariably limit the issuing
bank's liability. Typically, the issuing bank is liable only for gross negligence
or willful misconduct and is absolved of liability for acts of God, machine or
computer breakdown or malfunction, and indirect, consequential, or special
damages. Further, the issuing bank usually reserves a right of indemnification
against the applicant for any unauthorized request or error in the
transmission of the applicant's message if the transmission included a proper
test-key verification or was automatically authenticated.
170. Telephone Interview with Vincent Maulella of Manufacturers Hanover Bank (April 29,
1991). James McGinley of Citibank had indicated in an earlier interview (May 10, 1990) that
responsibility for the safe and secure usage of the software was one of the most sensitive issues in the
bank-applicant relationship.
171. For a description of the practices prevailing in 1986, see Kozolchyk, 8 George Mason U L
Rev at 285 (cited in note 52).
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This writer is unaware of any court decision on the issuing bank's liability
as custodian of the applicant's electronic draft of the letter of credit or as a
negligent issuer of the applicant-initiated electronic letter of credit. Lloyds
Bank Plc. v. Lynch, 172 although a SWIFT transfer of funds rather than a letter-
of-credit decision, sheds some light on the issuing bank's possible liability for
damages. Plaintiff bank was retained by one of the defendants to transfer
100,000 dollars via SWIFT in connection with a proposed merger between
defendants and Interleukin II, Inc. Plaintiff was supposed to have added the
following message in the "Details of Payment" segment of the transfer of
funds message: "INTER LEUKIN 2 FIRST OF FIVE INSTALLMENTS OF
USD 100,000.00 EACH." As a result of a clerical error, the quoted words
were omitted from the SWIFT message. Defendants' counterclaim alleged
that owing to the mistake, the merger fell through and defendants failed to
realize an estimated 100 million dollars gain in the value of Interleukin II
stock.
In a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, the court
reasoned that defendants had asserted a breach sufficient to saddle plaintiff
with liability for defendants' lost gains. The court considered whether the
delivery of the message as instructed would have consummated the merger.
In other words, did the defendants have a cause of action against Interleukin
II if it refused to merge? The court found that it was "incomprehensible that
after such care as to draft and circulate a proposed Memorandum of
Agreement, [Counterclaimant] Plaintiff Lynch would attempt to 'close' the
transaction by such a method as the detail of payment line in a wire
transfer."1 73 The court distinguished between the cryptic terms of a wire
transfer (a means of payment) and the terms and conditions of the underlying
merger agreement. As to plaintiff's liability for consequential damages for a
failure to exercise due care, the court relied on a "reasonably foreseeable"
test. 174 In order to bear responsibility for failure of the underlying merger,
"Lloyds must have reasonably foreseen that its failure with respect to the
SWIFT transfer would lead to the resulting damage."' 175
The court found that Lloyds was neither a party to nor intimately involved
in the failure of the underlying merger but rather was retained as a
correspondent bank as part of a "routine international money transfer."1 76
Thereafter, the court added language that banks issuing letters of credit via
SWIFT or otherwise should find worth remembering:
Lynch could have employed Lloyds in another capacity, providing the bank with
independent knowledge of the underlying transaction and an understanding of the
bootstrapping of the deal which was being attempted by the transfer's detail of
payment provision. This would have alerted Lloyds to the potential liability as well as
172. 702 F Supp 157 (ND Ohio, 1988).
173. Id at 159 (parenthetical information added).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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providing it an opportunity to independently evaluate the attendant risks and to
charge an appropriate fee. This was not done. 177
Thus, despite the finding that consequential damages were not reasonably
foreseeable in this case, the court left open the door to claims for
consequential damages where, as in everyday issuances of letters of credit, the
issuing bank is "with independent knowledge of the underlying transaction
and an understanding of the bootstrapping of the deal."
E. Facsimile Letters of Credit and Credifax Rules
Facsimile (fax) transmissions of applications for the issuance of letters of
credit and subsequent fax issuances have become quite popular. The fax
medium is not paperless, but it combines the speed of a telecommunication
with the convenience of paper. 178 Yet fax communications, unlike SWIFT's,
are not part of a system or network, but are open to anyone with a fax
machine and connected telephone line. This explains why the bankers' main
concern with faxed letter-of-credit or application messages is their lack of
security. Many faxes, like General MacArthur's old soldier, simply fade away,
leaving no trace of their former contents. Thus, if a fading fax document were
to be used as an original, its enforcement would soon become uncertain and
useless for audit trail purposes. Some fax machines produce permanent
copies, but each of these copies, aside from being able to qualify as the
original operative credit instrument, is also highly insecure. Assuming that it
was not a total fabrication, the original message could have been easily
forged, cut, pasted, and recomposed. Thus the validity of the signature or of
other authentication devices in a faxed operative credit instrument cannot be
reliably established unless the message were subjected to sophisticated
enciphering and authentication procedures that are unsuited, as of this
writing, for widespread use. t 79
The popularity of faxed applications and letters of credit prompted the
International Cargo Handling Co-Ordination Association ("ICHCA") to
propose the adoption of its "Credifax" rules to the ICC Banking Commission
during its 1990 meeting in Hamburg. 80 These rules were promptly rejected
177. Id.
178. A fax machine enciphers the image of the message sent because it digitizes it (a form of
enciphering) and translates it into sound. This sound is, successively, digitized by the phone
company and de-digitized by the fax machine at the receiving end of the message. It is at this end
where the paper-based, graphic version of the message is produced.
179. The author is indebted to Gad Janay, one of the premier developers of letter-of-credit
software and technology for his evaluation of the fax and optical imaging media. According to Mr.
Janay, only banks such as Citibank and Bankers Trust which have their own communications network
can engage in the kind of enciphering and authentication of fax messages that might make them
more secure. Yet, aside from the slowness in the communication that such security measures would
introduce, fax messages outside that network would remain highly insecure.
180. See Summary Record of the June 28, 1990 Banking Commission meeting in Hamburg, ICC
Doc 470/629 (July 27, 1990). See also the ICHCA request for adoption of Credifax in ICC Doc
470/590 (Nov 22, 1989). The text of the proposed rules (hereinafter referred to as "Credifax rules")
follows:
(1) In accordance with formal instructions by the applicant for a documentary credit, the
documents of which are to be telefaxed, the issuing bank issues a credit specifying the
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by the Commission, and in this writer's opinion, justifiably so. To begin with,
they were poorly drawn. While they validate the issuance of "a credit
specifying the certified transfer of all documents from bank to bank by telefax"
upon 'formal instructions by the applicant,'' t1 they do not clarify the meaning
of "formality" and "certification," especially in connection with applicable
law. And unless these terms are given uniform meanings, their variation in
different national laws would render the Credifax rules useless.
In addition, the Credifax rules would confer the power to issue the
Credifax letter of credit not upon the party who assumes liability thereunder
(either the issuing or confirming bank) but upon the applicant for the credit.
Bankers could not abdicate such a power without risking serious losses. 182
Finally, the Credifax rules would do nothing to induce greater security in the
use of the telefax medium. The mere insertion of words such as "subject to
the telefax transfer procedure"'8s3 or the applicant's willingness to accept on a
temporary basis the photocopy of the telecopy of a specified document' 84
would not induce or encourage the utilization of safer procedures of
telecommunication.
The rejection of the Credifax rules by the Banking Commission serves as a
warning of the need to address the issues of security of the teletransmissions
and consistency with the differing laws on formalities, certifications, and
authentications of messages. No doubt much ground would have to be
covered, but the task is inevitable. For unlike the SWIFT rules, the rules on
faxed messages apply to an open environment and to an unlimited number of
users.
certified transfer of all documents from bank to bank by telefax, the transport document
should be, in such a case, issued in behalf of the issuing bank.
(2) All documents, including the transport document (original bill of lading) should bear
the mention: "subject to the telefax transfer procedure."
(3) The bank of the beneficiary transfers by certified telefax to the issuing bank all the
documents of the credit. The original documents should be mailed as soon as possible.
(4) The issuing bank hands over to the applicant for the credit:
(a) a photocopy of the telecopy of the bill of lading duly endorsed as well as
photocopies of the telecopies of the other documents;
(b) a commitment vis-a-vis the carrier not to use the full set of bill of lading endorsed
by the bank and the importer.
(5) When collecting the photocopies mentioned under (4) above, the applicant for the
credit (importer) agrees to accept without any reservation the original documents that the
issuing bank will given (sic) him as soon as they are received, except the bill of lading.
The bill of lading will be handed over to the carrier within a maximum period of three
months.
181. See Credifax Rules § (1) (cited in note 180) (emphasis added).
182. As stated by Charles del Busto, Chairman of the Banking Commission during the 1990
Hamburg meeting:
The option of having documents transmitted via fax was a condition that could be allowed
when a letter of credit is issued but . . . it had to be agreed by the issuing bank, the
confirming and the beneficiary. However, the ICC could not endorse the Credifax rules
because of the inherent dangers in using fax transmissions and the ease with which such
documents can be tampered with ....
ICC Doc 470/629 (cited in note 180).
183. See Credifax Rule 3 (cited in note 180).
184. See id Rule 4.
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III
PAPERLESS "DOCUMENTS OF TITLE"
A. Introduction
The documents usually required by letters of credit have either
informational or title-transferring functions. The data in an informational
type of document may include the description of the goods, the listing of the
terms and conditions of insurance coverage, or the certification of volume,
weight, health, or quality. Considerable progress has been made on a
uniform layout and standardized text for the customs' invoice and possibly
other informational documents. 85 The trading nations' adoption of the
United Nation's syntax for electronic business and administrative messages
("EDIFACT") i8 6  should make it possible to transmit many of the
informational messages cheaply and reliably from beneficiaries' and third
parties' places of business to banks.
Computer and telecommunications technology has also attempted to
incorporate the three main functions of the ocean bill of lading (receipt of the
goods, contract of freight, and document of title) into telecommunicated
messages. 87 As a result of this technology, several types of paperless bills of
lading are currently in use. Most of these bills, however, are just carrier-
issued receipts. Only a few of the paperless bills currently in use can act as
documents of title to the merchandise, and even fewer qualify as negotiable
documents of title.
The fact that the negotiable-document-of-title function has not yet been
fully incorporated into a paperless bill does not mean that paperless bills have
no banking value. A paper-based ocean bill of lading is valuable to banks for
both its informational and its document-of-title functions. As an
informational document, it attests to the carrier's receipt of the goods at a
given time and place, to the apparent state of the goods when received, and to
185. See, generally, Bergsten & Goode, eds, Trading With EDI at 72-96 (cited in note 55). See
also U.N. Commission on Int'l Trade Law, U.N. Trade/WP.4/R.590, United Nations Standard
Message ("UNSM") for Formal Trial Customs Declaration Message: A proposed UNSM Customs
Declaration Message that will permit the transfer of information from a consignor/exporter or a
consignee/importer to a customs administration to effect the necessary declaration. An exporter
may also consider sending the message to an importer as the basis of the import declaration in the
country of import. For the layout key of trade documents, see U.N. ECE/Trade/137, G.E. 81-32329
(Nov 1981) and International Organization for Standardization (ISO), EDIFACT Application Level
Syntax Rules, ISO 9735:1988(E).
186. According to Roos, "[t]he UN/EDIFACT syntax rules set the standards for structuring data
into segments, segments into messages, and messages into a transfer (interchange)." Roos, in
Thomsen & Wheble, eds, Trading with EDI at 53 (cited in note 55). For a description of EDIFACT
efforts until 1990, see id at 53-60. Skeptics doubt that progress on standardization, beyond the
present stage, is in the offing. One such skeptic recently told this writer that "if a dictatorial
government cannot get all its industrial, financial, and commercial people to agree on EDI standards,
how could you achieve such agreement in pluralistic societies and on a worldwide basis?"
Nevertheless, despite the large number of inconsistent proprietary standards, more and more large
businesses in major trading centers are accepting the inevitability of a uniform standard.
187. The following discussion in the principal text summarizes descriptive and analytical
materials in Boris Kozolchyk, 23 J Maritime L & Commerce at 161 (cited in note 79).
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the loading of the goods on board the (specified or unspecified) vessel. It is
also true that as a negotiable document of title, it is valuable collateral, as it
allows quick, easy, and inexpensive possession and resale of the cargo.
Nowadays, however, few banks rely primarily on the collateral value of bills of
lading when deciding whether or not to issue or to confirm a documentary
credit; most rely more on the applicant's creditworthiness than on the cargo's
market value.
B. Paperless Receipts of Lading
1. Introduction. The sea waybill, the air waybill, and the rail consignment
note function as receipts of the goods by the sea, air, and rail carriers and also
as informational documents. Unlike documents of title, these bills do not
have to be presented to the carrier in order to obtain possession of the goods.
The consignee of an air, sea, or railroad bill of lading needs only to identify
himself to obtain possession. Nonetheless, since these receipts are often
needed before the arrival of the goods to expedite their release, they can be
transmitted electronically to the consignee or "notify party." And as long as
their layout is uniform and their text is structured and standardized, they can
be transmitted to anyone, including customs officials and banks, using the
same EDI software.
In addition to allowing the ship to unload immediately upon arrival
(thereby reducing the time and cost of unloading, processing, and
warehousing of the cargo), the sea waybill also allows the consignor to vary
his delivery instructions during the carriage. This feature can be useful when
buyers suddenly become insolvent or when unfavorable market conditions
require re-routing of the cargo. Roughly fifty percent of the North Atlantic
trade relies upon the sea waybill, although it seems more popular with
Scandinavian-initiated westbound traffic than with North American-initiated
eastbound traffic. 188
2. The Scandinavian Data Freight Receipt. In 1971, the Atlantic Container
Lines ("ACL"), one of the world's largest container carriers, introduced a sea
waybill labeled Data Freight Receipt ("DFR") for its North Atlantic
shipments. As with the air waybill, the DFR eliminated the need to send
paper documents with the shipment. All that was needed was a computer at
each end of a dedicated phone line and software to allow computer-to-
computer communications. ACL communicated the issuance of the DFR to
ACL's office at the consignee's place of business, in conjunction with which it
separately sent an arrival notice and manifest. The goods were delivered
188. The materials in the present and following section on the data freight and cargo key receipt
were obtained in large measure from interviews conducted by this writer in Gothenburg, Sweden on
June 29,1990, with Messrs. Peter Lyon of Transagency Inc., Hans E. Laessker, Esq., Legal Advisor to
Atantic Container Lines ("ACL"), and Soren Lonnartesson of SWEPRO. (Notes on these interviews
are on file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona College of Law.) The author
is most grateful to the interviewees for sharing their time and knowledge and to Professor Kurt
Gronfors of Stockholm University for having arranged these interviews.
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upon either the consignee's or the notify party's identification, and delivery
did not require presentation of the arrival notice.
As with the air waybill, the DFR was non-negotiable. It acknowledged
receipt only for shipment and not for on-board loading. Its text also differed
sharply from the traditional ocean bill of lading's because it lacked the terms
and conditions of carriage, including the customary disclaimers of liability.
Since the DFR was not a document of title, but merely a receipt and notice of
shipment, it did little to assure the consignee or bona fide purchaser of the
goods that the shipper would not resell or reroute the goods in transit.
Neither did it allow a bank to acquire a perfected security interest in the
cargo.
3. The Cargo Key Receipt ("CKR "). As with the Scandinavian DFR, the cargo
key receipt ("CKR") provided an arrival notice given either to the consignee
or to designated notify parties. Unlike the DFR, the CKR contained a "no
disposal" (also known as "no disp") clause expressly agreed to by the shipper-
consignor and the carrier at the moment of issuance of the CKR. The CKR
named the third-party creditor as consignee and the buyer as notify party; no
other parties participated in the transaction. The CKR, therefore, was
designed as a closed transaction that precluded negotiation of either the CKR
or the master bill of lading.
The conceptual basis of the CKR was the conveyance of the seller's right
to control the goods while in transit to the secured creditor. This is a
"negative" right because its object was not to retain permanent possession for
the seller, but to prevent the buyer's acquisition of possession. While
Professor Gronfors has traced the roots of this right to the Germanic
Sperrfunktion,'89 similar rights in our day are both conveyed by the transfer of
the "shipper's" copy of the air waybill and retained by unpaid sellers under
section 2-705 of the UCC.190 By means of the "no disp" clause in the CKR,
then, the shipper-consignor agreed to a known (although not widely used)
method of creating a security interest-that is, the conveyance of his negative
possessory right to a consignee who was either an issuing or a confirming
bank. This possessory right was limited and partial because rights similar to
those of the consignor inured to any other holder of the "original" CKR (if
such there was). In addition, the right of control conveyed by the "no disp"
clause to an issuing bank, for example, could not interfere with the carrier's
normal operations of storage, loading, and unloading, although it did permit
stoppage in transit, withdrawal of the goods at the departure pier, unloading
of the goods already placed on board the vessel, and warehousing or
189. See Kurt Gronfors, Towards a Transferable Sea Waybill: An Answer to Shortcomings of
Bills of Lading, A Report to the Hamburg Symposium on Sea Waybills 7 (Oct 2, 1987)
(unpublished report on file with the Documentation Center of the University of Arizona College of
Law).
190. UCC § 2-705(1) in relevant part states: "The seller may stop delivery of goods in the
possession of a carrier or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent (section 2-702)
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rerouting of the goods, including their delivery to a consignee other than the
one indicated in the ocean bill. The buyer-importer, who, as indicated above,
was usually designated as the notify party of the CKR, was one of the two
parties to receive the arrival notice, the other being the consignee-creditor.
When the buyer-notify party paid the amount owed to the issuing bank, it
received the latter's authority to claim the goods from the carrier.
The CKR reduced the use of paper documents considerably and provided
a means to secure the interest of the distant issuing bank in an almost
paperless bill of lading. The question should be asked then, why was not such
a seemingly logical scheme acceptable to banks, especially in the United
States? The answer is that the issuing bank was not sufficiently protected as
an assignee of the consignor's negative possessory rights. The CKR did not
qualify as a perfected security interest under the UCC. Section 9-304(3) of
the UCC requires that a security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee
who has not issued a negotiable document of title be perfected by notifying
the issuance of document in the name of the secured party. Alternatively, it
can be perfected by notifying the bailee of the secured party's interest or by
filing as to the goods. 19 1 None of these acts was performed in the CKR
transaction. Moreover, since the CKR was not a document of title, the bank
had a security interest not in the goods themselves, but rather in the
consignor's right of control over the shipment. Since this right qualifies as a
"general intangible" under the catch-all definition of UCC section 9-106, a
security interest therein could not be perfected by the issuance of the CKR by
the carrier-bailee, as would be the case under UCC section 9-304 if the CKR
were a negotiable document of title. An appropriate filing of the security
interest is, in this writer's opinion, required unless the security interest is
characterized as arising "solely under the Article on Sales," a characterization
that ill fits the CKR transaction. 92 The lesson derived from the banks'
rejection of CKR is that a paperless conveyance of rights to cargo will have to
involve a more effective security interest than the seller's negative possessory
rights.
191. See id § 9-304(3).
192. Id § 9-113 states that as long as the seller's debtor is not in possession of the goods no
security agreement is necessary and no filing is required. Yet, the article 2 security interest
predicated upon UCC § 2-705's right of stoppage of delivery in transit is narrower in scope than the
right conveyed to the bank by the CKR. Section 2-705 applies only when the seller discovers the
buyer's insolvency or when the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before delivery of if
for "any other reason the seller has a right to withold or reclaim the goods." Before such a time, the
right, and consequently the article 2 security interest, does not exist. Assuming, then, the need to file
and assuming proper filing under UCC § 9-401, the bank's interest could still be inferior to that of a
buyer of the goods in the ordinary course of business or of consumer goods under UCC § 9-307 if
somehow the goods subject to the bank's control became inventory or consumer goods.
Furthermore, even if the bank's interest was deemed to apply to the buyer's inventory, a purchase
money security interest in the same inventory would, in accord with UCC § 9-312, be prior to the
bank's. The net effect is that even if the bank obtains possession of the goods by means of its security
interest on the right of control of the shipment, it could very quickly lose its possession to third-party
creditors or buyers.
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4. Privity of Contract, Abstraction, and the English Sea Waybill. Privity of
contract has remained a major obstacle to the modernization of English bill-
of-lading law.' 93 Under the nineteenth-century English law, the rights under
the contract of freight still are transferred only to a person "to whom the
property in the goods passes upon by reason of endorsement."' 194 This
requirement causes a problem for sea waybills as much as for traditional bills
of lading. Where property to the goods does not pass to the consignee of the
bill of lading or passes independently of the bill of lading or where the
transfer of the bill of lading does not cause the transfer of title, neither the
consignee nor the holder can claim the goods from the carrier.' 95 Thus, if
English sea waybills were ever to be used as documents of title-that is,
conveying at least as much of a property right to the goods shipped as the
consignor had (as is the case with "straight" bills under the statutory law of
the United States)-these sea waybills would have to be freed from the privity
restriction. ' 9 6
In addition, bill-of-lading law would have to be freed from other
contractual and agency law restrictions such as the ultra vires doctrine
enunciated in the landmark English case of Grant v. Norway.' 97 In this case, a
master who signed a bill of lading for twelve bales of silk that had not been
shipped was held to have had no authority to issue such a bill, and this
rendered the bill unenforceable. The English and Scottish Law Commissions
recently recognized the need to remove this obstacle and thereby to free the
carrier's obligation to deliver the goods from the relationships between the
shipper and the carrier or the carrier and other carriers or agents for carriage.
In accordance with the Commissions' recomendations, a bill of lading stating
that the goods had been shipped or received for shipment "and in the hands
of a lawful holder, should be conclusive evidence against the carrier of such
shipment or receipt."' 19 8
193. See English Law Commission No 196 and Scottish Law Commission No 130, Rights of Suit
in Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea (1991) ("Law Commissions' Report").
194. The English Bills of Lading Act, An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Bills of Lading,
1859, 18 & 19 Vict ch 111 § 1 (stating that every consignee named in the bill of lading and every
endorsee of a bill of lading could assert contractual rights of action against the carrier but only if the
interest in the goods passed to the consignee of the consignment or endorsement).
195. See Law Commissions' Report at 5 (cited in note 193).
196. In the law of the United States, a straight bill of lading is, although not negotiable, a
transferable document and as such functions as a document of title in accordance with the Pomerene
Act, 49 USC §§ 109 & 112. As set forth in relevant part of 49 USC § 112:
A person to whom a bill has been transferred, but not negotiated, acquires thereby as
against the transferor the title to the goods, subject to the terms of any agreement with the
transferor. If the bill is a straight bill such person also acquires the right to notify the carrier
of the transfer to him of such bill and thereby to become the direct obligee of whatever
obligations the carrier owed to the transferor of the bill immediately before the notification
197. (1851) 10 CB 665.
198. Law Commissions' Report No 5 at 40 (cited in note 193).
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5. The Negotiable Electronic Bill of Lading.
a. SeaDocs registry limited. It is quite common in the oil spot market to sell
one oil cargo repeatedly during a trading day to traders in different parts of
the globe. SeaDocs Registry Limited ("SeaDocs"), a London cooperative
venture between Chase Manhattan Bank and INTERTANKO (an association
of oil tankers), was intended to bring about the telecommunicated negotiation
of bills of lading issued in connection with oil shipments. Unfortunately,
while SeaDocs was the first serious attempt to fashion a negotiable electronic
bill of lading that proved to be technically feasible, it was unsuccessful and
was closed within one year of its inauguration in 1986.199
SeaDocs acted as a depository-custodian of the paper-based original bill
and as a registry of bill-of-lading negotiations. The registry was to act as an
agent for the parties' (sellers' and buyers') endorsement of bills and for the
delivery of the final version of the paper-based bill of lading with which to
claim the goods from the carrier. Its operative scheme was as follows: (1) A
bill would be issued by the carrier in the traditional negotiable, paper-based
manner, but it would be taken out of circulation immediately after issuance,
and the original bill would be sent to SeaDocs by courier for safekeeping in its
vault. (2) Upon delivery of the original bill to SeaDocs, the shipper would
receive a code or test key equivalent to the personal identification numbers
("PINs") provided by banks for use with automated teller machines. (3)
When the bill was negotiated, the shipper or his endorsee would notify
SeaDocs by computer of the buyer-endorsee's name and also provide the
endorsee with a portion of his test key. (4) The seller's message would be
tested by SeaDocs before it accepted the communication from the endorsee-
buyer, and the endorsee-buyer's message would then be tested and accepted
if it contained the portion of the original seller's test key. (5) Compliance with
the various checks having been confirmed, the name of the new owner of the
bill would be recorded in the registry (this name would also be entered on the
documentary bill of lading deposited in SeaDocs' vault). (6) Any
endorsement reflecting the bill's negotiation would be effected by SeaDocs as
an agent for both endorser and endorsee. (7) When the goods arrived at the
port of discharge, SeaDocs would transmit an identifying code number to the
ship's master and would send a similar identifying code to the last endorsee or
owner of record of the original bill. (8) Using this number, the last endorsee
or owner of record would obtain the printout of the hard copy of the final bill
of lading with which to claim the goods.
199. According to the Oil Daily, the idea for SeaDocs came from Per Gram, a Norwegian
maritime lawyer, as a result of a notorious case involving the shipment of a cargo of Italian gasoil to a
trader in Northern Germany in 1978. Marvin Murphy, Energy Finance Report, Oil Daily (June 10,
1985). The cargo was delivered by the captain of the Norwegian vessel "Sagona" before receiving
the original bill of lading, and this delivery triggered a number of lawsuits by various claimants to the
oil. Per Gram circulated a paper proposing a solution to the Sagona type of problem. "As a result of
a study started by Chase, a system for handling documents was scribbled on the back of an envelope
at the hotel lobby in Norway." Id. Several reasons have been adduced for its lack of sucess. One of
the most frequently heard is that the cost of insurance was prohibitive and that not enough users
expressed a continuing interest.
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Despite its demise, SeaDocs proved that an international, centralized,
largely electronic bill of lading was technically feasible. From the standpoint
of the paperless letter of credit, its most important lesson was that unlike the
DFR, the CKR, and the English sea waybill, SeaDocs' PIN conveyed rights to
the goods equivalent to those conveyed by a negotiable bill of lading that
were enforceable as of the moment of the transmission of the appropriate
messages by SeaDocs.
b. The comiti maritime international's ("CMI's ") "private key." The rules for
electronic bills of lading adopted in 1990 by the CMI 200 are the most
sophisticated attempt to date to regulate open-ended, computerized issuance
and negotiation of bills of lading. Unlike the SWIFT rules, the CMI rules can
apply to any contracting party willing to abide by them. As optional rules,
however, the CMI rules require that the parties to the electronic bill of lading
specify the application of the rules in the "master" or in individual
agreements.
The main feature of the CMI rules is the creation of an electronic bill of
lading not by a centralized entity such as SeaDocs but by the carrier, which
also acts as a registry of negotiations. Accordingly, the CMI electronic bill of
lading can be issued by as many carriers as have the necessary hardware and
software, and it can be "endorsed" by as many endorsees as have the same
facilities. The device that makes such issuance, endorsement-negotiation, and
registration possible is the "private key." The private key, in the words of one
of the CMI draftsmen, is "akin to a single transaction personal indentification
number."20 1
The CMI's private key operative scheme is as follows: (1) Upon receiving
the goods, the carrier electronically sends to the shipper or the party
designated by the shipper a "receipt message" containing a description of the
goods and reservations by the carrier on the state of the goods. (2) The
recipient confirms receipt of the message to the carrier, and following this
confirmation, the carrier provides him with the private key. (3) Depending
upon the specific system in use, the shipper and subsequent holders of the
electronic bill of lading receive a password to access the carrier's computer
network and/or an identification number and a private key. (4) The shipper
or subsequent sending party then inputs the electronic address of the carrier-
receiving party, and, as with telex messages, each party to the transmission
sees the other party's address as the electronic "handshake" takes place. (5)
200. Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading (Comit6 Maritime International, 1990) ("CMI Rules").
For a published version of these rules, see Letter of Credit Update 33 (June 1990). The final version
of the CMI Rules was published in Letter of Credit Update 21-31 (April 1991). The description of
the operation of the CMI private key is mostly taken from a Memorandum of March 1, 1991 to this
writer by George F. Chandler III, of the law firm of Hill, Rivkins, Loesberg, O'Brien, Mulroy &
Hayden, one of the CMI rules draftsmen ("Chandler Memorandum"). The writer is very grateful for
Mr. Chandler's most helpful memorandum.
201. Chandler Memorandum at 8 (cited in note 200). CMI Rule 2(f) defines the private key as
"any technically appropriate form, such as a combination of numbers and/or letters, which the
parties may agree for securing the authenticity and integrity of a Transmission."
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After the security procedures are satisfied and the message is sent, the private
key is used by the shipper or subsequent holders to verify the authenticity of
the message. Thus, even though a fraudulent sender may know how to access
the network and establish a valid identity, he cannot obtain possession of the
goods without the use of the private key.
In an attempt to avoid multiple transfers of the same bill, the private key
itself is rendered nontransferable. If a holder nonetheless transfers his
private key, the carrier will be responsible for delivering the goods only to the
party to whom it issued the last valid private key. The carrier will be liable for
misdelivery, however, if it issues similar private keys or breaches the private
key security safeguards. Unlike the CKR and SeaDocs procedures, which
require presentation of a paper-based bill or authorization to obtain release of
the goods, the private key is supposed to function as the equivalent of the
negotiable ocean bill of lading. Its lawful use entitles the holder to the
delivery of the goods.
When conveying the right of control and transfer, a holder of the private
key relies on the same method of notification by which he became a holder.
He will initiate the message to the carrier and will need to await the carrier's
confirmation of its reception before the transfer process can be set in motion.
Following confirmation, the carrier transmits the receipt message (possibly
containing some such updating as loading on board the vessel) to the new
holder. Upon confirmation of the reception of the carrier's message by the
new holder-a confirmation that includes his acceptance of the right of
control and transfer-the carrier will cancel the current private key and will
issue a new private key to the new holder. In order to effectuate delivery of
the cargo, the carrier notifies the holder of the place and date of intended
delivery. Once so notified, the holder is obligated to nominate a consignee
and to give delivery instructions to the carrier with verification by private key.
Delivery of the goods by the carrier pursuant to these instructions
automatically cancels the private key.
Bankers cannot visualize how telecommunications between strangers can
be accomplished without incurring a high risk of fraud. They prefer the
security of uniform log-in procedures, message numbering, error checking,
encryption, record retention, uniform formats, and message self-auditing
associated with SWIFT procedures. From a legal standpoint, it is doubtful
whether the private key procedure can function as a negotiable bill of lading.
The transferee's rights in the private key procedure depend upon both
issuance of a private key and the transferee's acceptance of the right to
control. Yet the transferee's acceptance of the right to control is based upon
the information in the receipt message transmitted by the carrier or by
someone purporting to be the carrier. Accordingly, it is not clear what rights
are accepted by the transferee; relying upon fraudulent information, he may
have accepted nonexisting rights. Meanwhile, the carrier may issue the
private key to the transferee in the belief he has accepted a genuine receipt
message. The rights incorporated into the private key, then, depend not only
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on the lawful acquisition of the private key, but also on the text of the carrier's
valid receipt message. And while no carrier would want to be bound by terms
and conditions other than those on the receipt message it sent, no transferee
would want to pay for an electronic bill whose terms and conditions are other
than those he received. This difficulty cannot be overcome by a stipulation
that the receipt message and the private key together are the equivalent of a
paper-based negotiable bill of lading. For as a rule, the creation of negotiable
documents of title is a prerogative reserved solely for the legislature. 20 2
The problem of unreliable receipt messages illustrates the need not only
for a consistent, self-sufficient, and nonseverable obligational message, but
also for a reliable entity that either issues or certifies the issuance of such a
message. Traditionally the entity entrusted with these functions is a
centralized registry. Centralized registries, regardless of legal system, have
proven essential for paper-based transfers and encumbrances of valuable
property. A fortiori, such registries are all the more indispensable for
electronic transfers or encumbrances. A centralized registry, d la SWIFT,
relies on more stringent security requirements than does the individual
carrier-CMI registry. And by spreading the cost of security and insurance
among a much larger number of users, the centralized registry makes the risk
of fraud more manageable. In addition, a centralized registry is the only legal
institution capable of providing requisite notice to the world at large.
It is true that much of the requisite notice to potential purchasers of paper-
based documents of title or to creditors relying on these documents as
collateral has been provided by the possession of these documents, as one
may reasonably assume that the possessor, by the mere fact of his possession,
is likely to have significant rights in the documents. Once the document of
title becomes intangible and invisible, however, possession, having been
rendered metaphysical, is no longer apparent and thus no longer serves a
notice function. The only effective notice for electronic transfers and
encumbrances, then, is that provided by a widely accessible registry. With
such a registry in place, a problem such as the incompatibility between the
carrier's actual receipt message and the message received by the transferee
would be considerably diminished. The registry would assume responsibility
for a breach of its security measures and for negligent or fraudulent
transmission under its control, as does SWIFT.203
202. See, for example, Official Comment to UCC § 7-104, which, in relevant part, states: "A
document of title is negotiable only if it satisfies this section." On German law, see Johannes C. D.
Zahn, et al, Zahlung und Zahlungssicherung im Aussenhandel 168, 192 (Walter DeGruyter (Berlin), 6th ed
1986), where he quotes section 363 of the German Commercial Code for an exhaustive list of the
categories of order paper (begebbares Orderpapier). This author states that an unlisted document
cannot be turned into a negotiable document of title (Traditionspapier) by mere agreement of the
parties and that such a transformation is only possible through legislation.
203. See text accompanying notes 56-70.
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IV
THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PAPERLESS LETrER OF CREDIT AND BILL
OF LADING
Usually neither the issuance of paperless credits nor their advice,
confirmation, negotiation, or payment is preceded by an agreement between
the issuing bank and its SWIFT correspondents concerning each or all of
these transactions. 20 4 Some issuers may have line-of-credit facilities with their
advising, confirming, or paying banks or may have agreed to act as
correspondent banks, but most of the transactions described above are
conducted among banks without pre-existing contractual commitments.
Similarly, it would be highly unusual if a carrier were to enter into an
agreement with each unknown transferee of the private key prior to the
issuance of the receipt message. In the absence of preexisting agreements
between the promisor and the promisee of a SWIFT letter of credit or a CMI
electronic bill of lading, what makes the issuing banks' and the carriers'
promises binding? Asked differently, what is the legal nature of these
paperless promises?
The determination of the legal nature of these promises is of more than
academic interest because it can help shape administrative and judicial
decisionmaking in the absence of positive law guidance at a time when the
volume and variety of paperless promises is growing rapidly. Since a bilateral
contract is seldom entered into between the promisor and the promisee of a
paperless letter of credit or electronic bill of lading, one may be tempted to
conclude that the contract between these parties is unilateral-that is, one in
which a promise or offer of a promise is issued in exchange for nonpromissory
action.20 5 Yet unilateral (as well as bilateral) contracts presuppose both the
need for the promisee's acceptance and the promisor's power to revoke his
offer prior to its acceptance.20 6 In contrast, it will be recalled that the issuers
of SWIFT's irrevocable letter-of-credit messages consider themselves bound
as of the moment of the release of the messages to SWIFT, regardless of
whether the promisees know about the promise or accept or rely upon it.
Similarly, even though the new holder of the CMI private key must confirm
his reception of the carrier's message of transfer, the carrier is bound by its
204. See Part I.A.4.
205. According to Corbin, "[t]he most common form of a unilateral contract is that in which the
offeror makes a promise and asks some performance by the offeree in return, clearly indicating that
the requested performance is the entire agreed exchange both for his promise and for the
performance that he promises." Arthur L. Corbin, 1 Corbin on Contracts § 70 (West, 1963). The
reason for the use of the word "traditional" in the principal text is that the Restatement has officially
abandoned the traditional division of bilateral and unilateral contracts. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 1 comment f (Am Law Institute, 1991) ("Second Restatement").
206. Section 42 of the Second Restatement states:
An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a
manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract.
Official Comment a, in turn, makes it clear that "most offers are revocable." See also Samuel
Williston, I Williston on Contracts §§ 55-56 (Baker, Voorhis, 3d ed 1957) (Walter Jaeger, ed), and
Corbin, 1 Corbin Contracts §§ 38-39 (cited in note 205).
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transfer message to cancel the current private key and to issue a new private
key to the new holder.
Moreover, neither the paperless letter of credit nor the CMI electronic bill
of lading can viably embody a promise whose enforcement depends upon
unknown contractual rights, duties, defenses, or equities. For no banker
would want to risk confirmation, negotiation, or payment of a SWIFT letter of
credit only to be denied reimbursement because the applicant had failed to
reimburse the issuing bank or because the beneficiary had sold unsatisfactory
goods to the applicant. Similarly, no bank would want to extend credit to its
applicant on the strength of an electronic bill of lading the description of
goods on which by an agent of the carrier could be deemed ultra vires, thus
rendering the bill unenforceable.
Hence, the paperless promises discussed in this article belong to the genus
of "abstract payment undertakings" insightfully analyzed by Professor Goode
in a recent essay:
[A] money promise which is independent of the transaction that gives it birth and
which is considered binding when received by the beneficiary (or sometimes even
when issued by the promisor) without acceptance, consideration, reliance, or
execution in solemn form. The type of contract (if it be such) generated by the
abstract payment undertaking fits neither the bilateral nor the unilateral model. It is
not bilateral for no promise is given in exchange; nor is it unilateral in the ordinary
sense, because its irrevocability does not depend on the performance, or even the
commencement of performance, of a designated act or forbearance.
2 0 7
After examining other possible theories of liability, Professor Goode finds
that what makes these promises binding is mercantile usage.20 8 He concludes
that
any payment undertaking of a kind which by mercantile usage is treated as binding on
receipt by the beneficiary will be so treated in English law where it conforms to the
requirements for such usage and the usage can be shown to be reasonable in the sense
of having a commmercial purpose which is not objectionable in terms of legal
policy.2
0 9
This writer'has also attributed the binding force of these promises to
mercantile usage210 but would like to carry Professor Goode's inquiry further
and identify the types of usage of paperless letters of credit. It should be
remembered that commercial and banking usages, like weeds, spring up from
unexpected places, emerging not only from the repeated observance of
similar contractual and promissory undertakings but also from everyday
practices under rules such as those found in SWIFT's Handbook or from
CMI's rules for electronic bills of lading. The normative difference between
207. Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings, in Peter Cane & Jane Stapelton, eds, Essays for
Patrick Atiyah 209, 209 (Oxford U Press, 1991). For a similar view, see Kozolchyk, 9 Intl
Encyclopedia Comparative L at § 12.3.4 (cited in note 5).
208. Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings at 209, 225 (cited in note 207).
209. Id at 225.
210. See Boris Kozolchyk, On the State of Commercial Law at the End of the Twentieth Century, 8 Arizona
J Intl & Comparative L 1, 26 (1991) ("Hence, the ultimate source of law, on many issues formerly
covered by traditional contract, is the usage of trade inspired by a pre-established, electronically
programmed method of doing business.").
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the actual rules in SWIFT's Handbook or in CMI's rules for electronic bill of
lading and a usage inspired by these rules is that while the usage may bind
users regardless of proof of a contractual "meeting of the minds," contractual
rules such as CMI's require such an agreement.
In addition, usages arise from everyday attempts to observe the SWIFT
and CMI rules when these rules fail to specify how certain acts or transactions
ought to be carried out and, knowingly or unknowingly, leave them to the
parties' discretion. For example, neither the SWIFT nor the CMI rules
preclude additional security arrangements agreed upon by their users for
their own operations. Users may adopt whatever security arrangements they
wish for transactions within their control as long as they do not conflict with
those specified by SWIFT or the CMI rules. Similarly, since the CMI rules do
not specify what language should be used in the carriers' receipt messages or
in the shippers' or transferees' acknowledgments or confirmations, the parties
are free to draft such messages as they will. Conceivably, over a period of
time, these security arrangements and customary clauses could become
sufficiently widespread to acquire the status of usages. Therefore, it is
important so to classify the usage so that courts can, depending upon the type
of usage involved, determine whether it is entitled prima facie to a
presumption of validity and to dispensation with proof of reasonableness and
consistency with legal (public) policy.
The first question in classifying the type of usage is determining who is
supposed to be governed by the usage? If the usage is supposed to govern an
open number of users or the public at large (public usages), it makes sense to
require what has been required since classical Roman law: long-term
observance (consuetudo longa) and the users' tacit consent to be bound (tacitus
consensus populi, tacita civium conventio).211 If, however, the usage applies only to
a closed number of users who are members of a commercial or trade
association and who have knowledge of its transactions (associational usages),
as is the case with SWIFT rules, it makes no sense to require that the usage be
inveterate. SWIFT's usages, for example, could not qualify as inveterate
because of their recency and changeability. Usages inspired by the SWIFT
User Handbook do qualify as associational usages, however, and knowledge
of SWIFT rules can be imputed to SWIFT users regardless of actual
knowledge.
CMI rules, on the other hand, are intended to apply to an open number of
users, including those ignorant of documents of title and maritime
transportation communications. This feature is consistent with CMI's
requirement that its application be agreed upon by the parties. Pan passu,
CMI rule-inspired usages, as public usages, require proof of a sufficiently
repeated practice, tacit consent, reasonableness, and consistency with public
211. Samuel Parsons Scott, Corpus Iuris Civilis, 1 lustianan Digest D. 1.3.32.1, 35 (Paulus Krueger,
1928). See also Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 411 (Am Philosophical Society,
1953) (voice Consuetudo). For a contemporary application of these requirements by French and
German courts, see text accompanying notes 95-99.
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policy. In contrast, even if a SWIFT user can prove that he never read or
expressly agreed to be bound by the SWIFT rules, his mere participation in
the SWIFT network and his use of SWIFT messages and transmissions impute
to him knowledge of the medium and compel him to follow the SWIFT User
Handbook when it applies.
The second question pertains to the authorship of the usage. Is the usage
in question a reflection of transactional behavior, or is it a nontransactional
technical usage? Consider, for example, the relationship between the UCP
and SWIFT. Many of SWIFT's rules incorporate UCP usages and are,
therefore, transactional usages. Other SWIFT rules, however, are not, strictly
speaking, banking usages but are rather the recommendations of computer
and communication experts on how best to communicate transactional
messages. As was discussed earlier, these technical usages impose duties of
diligence upon SWIFT users but do not create transactional rights or duties
within or without the SWIFT environment. 21 2
The third and final question relates to the inevitability of the composition
of the usage: does the usage in question necessarily require certain elements
(necessary usage), or is it flexible enough to carry out its mission with
equivalent or interchangeable elements (optional usage)? The task assigned
to technical usages renders them more optional in character than
transactional usages. Technical usages shape the means with which to
communicate a message. If successful, they act as both the message's
receptacle and its carrier. Thus, technical usages will determine the
message's layout, syntax, and verification of authenticity as well as its routing.
Their task lends technical usages a flexibility restricted only by the limitations
of the medium, whether it be electronic or paper-based. For example, when
the bill of exchange began to be used in large numbers in Renaissance
Europe, the drawer's column was located at the bottom right and the
acceptor's column at the bottom left of the letter-like document, but within
the confines of this medium, the location of the columns was flexible enough
to be interchangeable. Mutatis mutandis, the timing and location of passwords
and electronic handshakes or the contents of the algorithm or of any other
authentication or security device are restricted only by the limitations of EDI.
The task of transactional usages, on the other hand, is to bind one or more
parties where neither contract nor official law establishes liability. As long-
distance trade increased, some transactional usages acquired the task of
expressing the promisor's liability and reassuring the promisee of its
irrevocability. The liability expressed by such usages may be a promise to pay
or to deliver, a request that the recipient issue such a promise (accompanied by
an expressed or implied promise of reimbursement), or an authorization for the
issuance of a promise, payment of money, or delivery of an object (similarly
accompanied by a promise of reimbursement). Among these transactional
usages, those designed to reassure distant strangers that the promised money
212. See text accompanying note 55 for a discussion of transactional and system or network
rights and duties.
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will be paid or the goods will be delivered must necessarily contain certain
legal elements. In addition to the promisor's or issuer's known solvency and
trustworthiness, the elements of reassurance are: (1) a clear expression of
when, how, for how much or for what, and to whom the promisor is liable; (2)
a standardized format, including reliable means for the verification of the
authenticity of the message; (3) certainty that there will be no unexpected
cancellation or revocation of the promise; and (4) a liability independent of
underlying transaction claims, defenses, or equities. In the final analysis, the
aim of such a usage is to support the circulation of promises the
trustworthiness of which approximates that of "hard" currency.
The SWIFT paperless credit and the CMI private key procedure are
intended to reassure distrusting and distant parties of the payment of a sum of
money or of the delivery of specified goods. Once a promise of payment of
money becomes as reassuring as SWIFT's letter of credit, it is "monetized"-
that is, quickly, easily, and cheaply convertible into cash or its equivalent by
means of bookkeeping entries in the banks' nostro and vostro accounts. Not all
the promises to pay money are monetized, and not all monetized promises are
money's equal. In a scale of "moneyness," a promissory note by a party of
unknown solvency ranks near the bottom, while a paperless promise to prepay
or reimburse a SWIFT paying bank ranks near the top for reasons consistent
with the presence of a necessary usage for monetized payments: SWIFT's
letter-of-credit messages are, as a rule, issued by parties of known solvency
and trustworthiness. They clearly specify the promisor's liability on a
standardized text that includes devices for its own authentication. And the
issuing bank's abstract promise of payment or reimbursment is established at
the earliest possible time-that is, when the message is released to SWIFT.
If CMI-inspired usages on the transfer and encumbrance of shipped goods
are to reassure third-party purchasers and creditors, including issuers of
paperless credits, they will have to contain, mutatis mutandi, the preceding
elements. In addition, their certainty and abstraction will have to be
complemented by the notice provided by a centralized registry. And as public
usages, they will not be binding until they have been observed for a
sufficiently long period and are proven reasonable and consistent with public
policy.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC LETrER OF CREDIT AND
RELATED DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
Two viewpoints are frequently expressed on the future of the electronic
letter of credit. The first regards the commercial letter of credit as a dying
instrument soon to be replaced by direct electronic or network payment
communications directly between buyers and sellers.2 13 A second viewpoint
maintains that the paper-based letter of credit will be replaced by two types of
213. This view has been expressed at various ICC meetings held during 1990 and 1991 on the
need to draft EDI rules for documentary credits by bankers who specialize in electronic fund
transfers and in the adaptation of EDI to banking documentation.
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electronic credit. 214 Type one will be the "default" credit, a credit payable
upon certification that the parties did not settle the claimed debt by
themselves. Although this credit is inexpensive and attractive to buyers, even
its proponents admit that it will not be attractive to most sellers because it
delays access to cash and requires surrender of the original documents when
the seller attempts to collect directly from the buyer. Sellers will, therefore,
insist on a second type of credit under which payment will be made by the
issuing or confirming bank upon tender not of a group of paper documents,
but of a single type of EDI message. This EDI message will state that the
confirming bank has received, for example, an electronic bill of lading or
waybill that on its face conforms with the terms and conditions of the credit,
that it has paid or accepted a draft, and that it expects reimbursement.
Documents transmitted electronically will not convey title to the goods; they
will only acknowledge receipt of the goods and convey other requested
information. These documents, therefore, will lack intrinsic value or
merchantability.
Bernard Wheble espouses an intermediate and, in this writer's opinion,
more plausible scenario. In a lecture delivered in Singapore in 1990,215
Wheble predicted that many documents as traditionally understood will cease
to exist in the context of the paperless credit. 216 At the same time, he warned
that the replacement of the traditional, paper-based bill of lading would pose
problems where the negotiability of the bill of lading was a requirement and
that for a considerable period of time, paper-based bills of lading may have to
continue to be used. He also warned of problems with respect to the
presentation of electronic documents other than the bills of lading. Among
these problems were the determination of the time and place of presentation,
to whom the messages should be addressed, who should be their direct
recipient, and whether the "originality" requirements should be preserved.2 17
According to Wheble, some of the these problems could be resolved by the
parties' reliance on UNCID and appropriate user manual.218
This writer shares Wheble's view of an eclectic (paper-based and
electronic) future. In addition, this writer is optimistic about the future of the
letter of credit, whether as a paper-based or paperless promise, owing to the
fact that distrust among trading partners is not likely to disappear soon.
Some buyers and sellers, some borrowers and lenders will settle directly with
each other, electronically or otherwise, but the remainder will continue to rely
on the reassurance provided by the issuing and confirming banks (or other
214. This view was espoused during the meetings referred to in note 213 by some documentary
credit bankers involved in the creation of paperless documents.
215. Bernard S. Wheble, Letter of Credit Practice-Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (Singapore Conferences, 1990) (on file with the Documentation Center of the
University of Arizona College of Law).
216. Id at 12.
217. "If the messages are sent direct to the seller by the service sector originator, they cannot be
regarded as original messages, that is, as the real equivalent of original documents when passed
'second hand' by seller to bank." Id at 13.
218. Id.
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parties of known solvency and trustworthiness) of a fair, knowledgeable, and
timely payment in exchange for the seller's complying documents or
messages.
Documents, among their other attributes, are implements of reassurance.
Some of the documents of the paperless credit, such as CMI's negotiable bill
of lading, have intrinsic or merchantable value. Other documents, such as a
certificate of origin or default, have only informational value. It should be
remembered, however, that the bank's role in the letter-of-credit transaction
is not only that of a paymaster, but also that of an escrow agent or fiduciary.
The bank is entrusted both with the applicant's money or promise of
reimbursement and with the beneficiary's complying documents. The bank is
also a knowledgeable arbiter of documentary compliance. By enabling the
bank to decide whether or not to pay on the basis of tendered documents,
these documents help bridge the gap of distrust between the parties. In this
role, a certificate of completion of a bridge issued by a trusted inspector could
be as reassuring to the entity that contracted for the building of the bridge as
is an on-board bill of lading to the buyer who needs possession of the goods
by a certain date. Therefore, as long as buyers and sellers, principals and
contractors, lenders and borrowers, and investors and promoters retain a
healthy distrust of each other and continue to trust banks as judges of
documentary compliance, there will be a need for the letter of credit's
reassurance. This is particularly true because banks, unlike other financial
intermediaries, can count on a worldwide network of trusted correspondents
who act not only as promisors, examiners of documents, and paymasters, but
also as carriers of valuable banking and trade information.
The transactional changes brought about by replacing a paper-based
operative credit instrument with a teletransmission affect the form of the
letter-of-credit transaction but not its underlying commercial function. The
fact that the operative credit instrument among banks is now the SWIFT
transmission, that the traditional notion of an "original" credit instrument is
no longer central, or that authentication has replaced handwritten, stamped,
or perforated signatures does not detract from the value of the bank's
reassurance. On the contrary, some of the most vexing legal problems with
promises of performance inter ausentes are now less troubling because of the
technological advances connected with the paperless letter of credit.
Consider, for example, the present ability of banks, regardless of location, to
exchange telecommunications around the clock and to verify that a given
message was received at a certain time, without errors, and in unaltered
fashion. There is every reason to assume that the same capabilities will be
available to applicants and beneficiaries. 219
219. At the present time, European Economic Community banks are preparing drafts of
EDIFACT messages that will allow applicants to communicate their request for issuances of letters
of credit, much as has been done during the last decade by their U.S. counterparts. The difference
between this EEC effort and the U.S. practice is that the messages and operating rules of the former
will be standardized and will rely on the same software throughout the EEC. This software will be
designed to enable issuing or confirming bank communications to the beneficiary including advises
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Considering the absence of technical difficulties with SeaDocs, 220 the
conclusions in Professor LoPucki's article in this symposium, 2 2 ' and Professor
Cumming's work in Canada, 222 computer technology stands ready to do the
job of supplying many, if not most, of the documents traditionally required by
the paper-based letter of credit. 22 3 The tasks awaiting the electronic
documentary credit are quite significant. One of these tasks will be to
reassure the buyers of debt and equity obligations in developing nations-
particularly in formerly socialist nations attempting to encourage the public's
investment in privately issued securities. The success of the reassurance
provided by standby letters of credit to buyers of these securities in the
United States can be gauged by their annual volume of issuance, which, when
last measured, exceeded $100 billion.2 24
and confirmation. Interview of Terry J. Mitchell, Senior Manager Documentary Services, Lloyds
Bank and British Bankers' Association Representative to the ICC Banking Commission (Aug 11,
1991). According to Mr. Mitchell, the electronic message for the documentary credit application
form was to receive status 1 (for discussion among the member neations) on September 1, 1991. In
addition to the normal documentary credit application language, the electronic message will contain
information on which account to debit, and on forward currency contracts. The terms and
conditions of the credit have been segmented for purpose of translation into EDIFACT language.
Segmenation under EDIFACT is much more detailed and elaborate than with SWIFT messages.
Each EDIFACT segment will contain smaller pieces of infomation to aid automation. Those parts of
messages that cannot be uniformly stated in small segments will be "free formatted." It is
anticipated that North American banks will, in due course, convert their proprietary packages
discussed in text accompanying notes 164-170 to EDIFACT, as SWIFT itself is in the process of
doing.
220. See note 199 and accompanying text.
221. Professor LoPucki's own summary of his conclusion is that the "currently available computer
technology is capable of overcoming most of the deficiencies identified.., and creating a medium
that communicates the contents of filed financing statements quickly, accurately and efficiently."
Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway,
55 L & Contemp Probs 5, 6 (Summer 1992).
222. During the August 1990 Oxford University meeting of the International Academy of
Commercial and Consumer Law, Professor Ronald Cuming, of the University of Saskatchewan, one
of the world's leading authorities on computerized personal property registries, told this writer that
under the computerized Canadian property registry systems that provide remote telephone access, it
is possible to register interests in a registry and conduct a search of the registry from any place in the
world that has reliable telephone access to the registry. In addition, arrangements are being made to
permit a search of all registries from a single registry using that registry's remote access to the other
registries. See Ronald C. C. Cuming, Computerization of Personal Property Security Registries: What the
Canadian Experience Presages for the United States, 23 UCC LJ 331, 336 (1991).
223. The argument is often heard that the traditional ocean bill of lading is being replaced by
nondocuments of title, and if that is the case, why fight the marketplace? It is true that a large part of
today's ocean carriage is documented with sea waybills and forwarders cargo receipts which are not
documents of title. It is also true that air transport relies on air waybills which are, similarly, not
documents of title. Nevertheless, these documents resulted from different marketplace
considerations. A shipment by a consignor, who is also the consignee's parent company, can easily
dispense with the document of title feature of the bill of lading. Similarly, a shipment of goods not
likely to be resold while being transported, either because of the nature of the goods or because of
the shortness of the journey, can, and often must, rely on nontitle transferring documents.
Prominent among these are the sea or the air waybill which help expedite the delivery of the cargo to
the named consignee. The same is not true, however, for other shipments such as of oil or grain.
These shipments are usually resold to buyers in different parts of the globe, often repeatedly during
one trading day. The spot as well as the futures market for these goods requires an electronic
negotiable document of title that can facilitate both sales and secured transactions on a global basis.
224. On the need for the reassurance mentioned in the principal text, see Boris Kozolchyk &
James E. Byrne, Can Standbys and Guarantees be Harmonized?-Report on XVth Session of UNCITRAL
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Another significant task will be to help "globalize" the market for
payments of principal and interest produced by financial standbys. Given the
state of SWIFT technology, it is conceivable that banks in every corner of the
globe could be examining the terms and conditions of "direct-pay" standbys
to determine whether they wish to acquire payments provided by these
standbys. They may also wish to participate in standby issuances either as co-
issuers, syndicators, or beneficiary-trustees.
The analysis of the rules that apply or purport to apply to the paperless
letter of credit yields valuable lessons for the lawmaker. The first lesson is not
to rush into lawmaking until all the relevant practices have been fully surveyed
and understood. The confusion and uncertainty generated by Official
Comment 3 to section 4A- 104 of the UCC could have been avoided if the
electronic and paper-based letter-of-credit payment and reimbursement
practices had been taken into account when writing electronic fund transfer
rules. The second lesson is that in writing definitions intended to govern
future practice, not to rely solely on the outer limits of existing practice. This
was the case with UCC section 5-103(1)(b)'s reference to paper in its
definition of "document" 225 and may well be the case with definitions of
electronic documents that include only formatted and standardized messages.
The third and final lesson is to heed Rudyard Kipling's injunction in
"Captains Courageous": "Things should ha' bin kep' sep'rate." The
environment within which each set of rules is supposed to operate should
determine the scope of application of the respective rules.
GROUP, in 7 Letter of Credit Update 6 (1991). According to statistics cited in this article, as of
December 31, 1990, there were outstanding in the United States $104,213,546,000 in financial
standbys, $52,417,793,000 in performance standbys, and $29,119,893,000 in commercial letters of
credit. Id at 11.
225. UCC § 5-103(l)(b), in relevant part, states that " '[d]ocument' means any paper including
document of title, security, invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like" (emphasis added).
This definition would prevent customs invoices and electronically transmitted bills of lading or sea
waybills, among other contemporary types of electronic messages, from being regarded as the
documentary components of "documentary drafts" or "demands for payment" under UCC art 5
(letters of credit).
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